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

'NO COLOURED NEED APPLY'

***KENNETH REXROTH** on Loisy, Tyrrell and Sullivan*
***WILSON C. McWILLIAMS** on George Kennan's memoirs*
***WILLIAM PFAFF** on the muddied American messianism*

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NEWS AND VIEWS

Credit the Conference of Major Superiors of Women Religious of Milwaukee with refreshing forthrightness in its recent response to last fall's statement of the American bishops on Catholic schools.

Patently fed up with the Sister's second-class status in the Church, the Conference zeroes in on aspects of the system that imposes on nuns a tradition of acquiescence and a sense of insecurity and frustration. Sample:

"In her apostolic work, the Sister expects to find [in dealings with bishops] the same openness, dialogue, truth-searching, and respect for person which she is finding in her community. Instead, she sometimes finds paternalism. An authority she has been encouraged to build from competence is frequently opposed by an authority derived from merely ecclesiastical structure; the dialogue to which she is accustomed is sometimes replaced by the request for loyal reinforcement of ultimatums. . ."

The Conference also complains that the Sister's "conscientious attempt to stimulate thought and form the responsible Chrisian student is hindered at times by the over-zealous concern of clergy and parents for the student's protection from the very problems which he will later meet."

The net result: "The mature woman in her convent is forced frequently to become the unquestioning daughter in the school."

The Conference asks of the bishops "open and intense" confrontation of conflicts inherent in Catholic education, and in this context calls for a realistic philosophy of education to replace the bishops' 1884 statement, "every Catholic child in a Catholic school."

Finally, the Conference rearticulates the modern nun's anxiousness to break out of traditional restrictive patterns, by emphasizing the teaching Sister's desire "to listen to all and to serve all, but especially the weak." The Conference statement adds:

"In the present Catholic educational structure, many women resent the fact that their service is frequently limited to the middle class. This resentment is underlined by an even narrower service to the Catholic middle class within a Catholic school structure, not to the entire people of God."

•

The search for a new president at Stanford, Minnesota or Amherst is an intense one- or two-year, coast-to-coast project, according to Jesuit educator Neil G. McCluskey. How about at the Catholic campus? Father McCluskey clues us:

"When there is a similar vacancy at St. Paphnutius University, Father Provincial and his four consultors look over the list of the *apti ad gubernandum*. Of the 200 professed Fathers, there are 25 on the list. Ten are past 70 years of age; five have never been inside a university; two are alcoholics, and three have had serious heart attacks in recent years. Of the five remaining candidates for the presidency, three lack the doctorate. We have left the provincial himself and the rector of the minor seminary—who gets the job."

•

Affiliate Artists, Inc., a cultural organization that seeks to refine talents while building larger and more appreciative audiences for the performing arts, is closing a successful first year and plans a 1968-69 program expanded three times beyond the present one.

At the moment, Affiliate Artists has vocalists, dancers and instrumentalists on grants at 15 colleges and universities across the country. Next year it aims to place 50; with increasing campus and corporate interest in the program, that number seems assured.

An Affiliate Artist grant is in the amount of $10,000—$6,500 of which goes to the artist in salary and the remainder for travel and promotional expenses.

Unlike the artist-in-residence, the affiliate artist does not live in, but visits a specific campus four to six times a year for one- to two-week periods. During his visits, he performs, confers informally with students and faculty, and gives lecture demonstrations to comunity and campus groups. The expense to the college is $2,000 minimally.

Affiliate Artists is located at 155 West 68th Street, Suite 25E, New York City, 10023. Inquiries may be addressed there to Richard C. Clark.

The office is particularly interested in hearing from Catholic colleges. There are no Catholic colleges in Affiliate Artists' first year's program, although a few are in negotiation for the '68-'69 academic year.

•

The Supreme Court's acceptance of the *Flast vs. Gardner* case, challenging the constitutionality of the application and provisions of the federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, has partisans of parochial schools in a state—since, of course, the suit aims to block aid to church-related schools.

Professor Daniel D. McGarry of St. Louis University sees the challenge as "the case of the century" for students "in non-governmental schools." He urges good citizens to rally behind Citizens for Educational Freedom and build a $100,000 court fund.

"Parsimony would be folly in this matter," McGarry writes in an appeal. "We cannot afford to allow this case to be handled by voluntary and haphazard services alone . . . We, too, must have our Pfeffer."

•

Inez Robb speculated in the Feb. 28 Washington *Daily News* that George Wallace will withdraw from the presidential race if the Republican nomination goes to Ronald Reagan, then confided:

"My informant . . . is a leader of the radical right. He sincerely believes that only Governor Reagan can save both the GOP and the United States, as he believed that only Barry Goldwater could save both in 1964."

How time does fly. JOHN DEEDY

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CORRESPONDENCE

"Troubled Priests"

Wheeling, W. Va.

To the Editors: Many thanks to you for your symposium on "The Troubled Priest." (Feb. 16). It shared its moments of light with lengths of banality, a very happy average if compared with similar conversations.

May I groan a bit over one of these ambivalences? Fr. McBride can be credited with a great ray of light when, in discussing the essence of a priest, he put forward the concept of "a man who celebrates life." I'm sure this is not totally original with Father, but he spoke it, and so moved the whole concept of priest beyond the external accident of one who had "hands laid upon him" to an intrinsic, personal concept of one who consciously embodies the true meaning of life within himself and invitationally communicates it to others, redeeming the world by this very meeting. The whole concept unfolds with great light. Then how crushing when, two pages later and in answer to the question of the permanency of the priest, McBride "sees nothing wrong if a priest decides to do something else." Can a man lose his vision, cease to communicate, stop being concerned with the world? A man, if he is not the accident of the bishop's hand, but intrinsically "priest," can never turn his back on redemptive life.

This has nothing to do with whether or not he is married or single, teacher or taxi driver (he can be any of these) but he cannot without default, stop being "priest": this man the world so much needs. Once having seen and embodied the vision of life, he is indelibly marked and can never return to a former blindness . . .

HILARY E. BENDER S.T.L.

New Haven, Conn.

To the Editors: In the context of "The Troubled Priest" (Feb. 16), Father Hafner raises the question of the prestige of deacons. As one who hopes to enter

(Continued on page 29)

NEWS & VIEWS: 2 **CORRESPONDENCE: 3**
EDITORIALS: 3
BALKANIZED MARXISM AND RED SEPARATISM: *Matthew M. Mestrovic* **6**
BIAFRA, NEW TARGET FOR GENOCIDE: *Patrick Riley* **7**
MUDDIED AMERICAN MESSIANISM: *William Pfaff* **8**
FREE WORLD FASCISM: *Czarina Wilpert & Peter Steinfels* **10**
LOISY, TYRRELL AND SULLIVAN: *Kenneth Rexroth* **12**
'NO COLOURED NEED APPLY': *William B. Gould* **14**
ROBERT BLY'S SPEECH: **17**
'TRIAL BY LAICIZATION': A RESPONSE: *Edward Heston* **18**
MEDIA: *John Quirk* **21** ***ETC.:*** *Jonathan Eisen* **22**
THE SCREEN: *Philip T. Hartung* **23**
BOOKS: 25

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TURNING POINT IN VIETNAM?

Will General Westmoreland's request for 200,000 additional troops spark a constructive national dialogue over Vietnam policy? It is possible, but just barely. The Administration now has one basic reaction to criticism at home or to setbacks in Vietnam: to run up the flag and hope critics will stop criticizing and start saluting. "Men may debate—men may dissent—men may disagree," said President Johnson, "and God forbid that a time should come when men of this land may not. But there does come a time when men must stand. And for America, that time has now come." In a similar vein, General Westmoreland drew this lesson from the recent Vietcong successes: "The time has come for debating to end, for everyone to close ranks, roll up their sleeves and get on with the job."

It is no wonder that the President and his men would like to nip any national debate in the bud by appealing to patriotic sentiment. By the middle of February, even before the latest Westmoreland request for more troops, public approval of Mr. Johnson's handling of the war had slipped to only 35 percent. *Newsweek,* in the second editorial in its 35-year-history, said that the success of the Tet offensive "exposed the utter inadequacy of the Administration's war policy"; Mr. Johnson, the magazine charged, had failed to provide "the firm, clear leadership expected of the man in the White House." For the Administration, then, any strategy that casts the President as embattled national leader is bound to be attractive, and the recent patriotic stance of Mr. Johnson & Co. is probably only a pale preview of the months ahead. Nor should the potential effectiveness of the red, white and blue gambit be underestimated. American men *are* being killed in Vietnam at a sickening rate, and if Mr. Johnson can get across the idea that critics of the war are indifferent to this fact, half his battle for re-election will be won. A

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little thought would make it clear, of course, that critics of the war hold the welfare of the American troops at least as dear as do those who believe in escalation and a fight to the bitter end, but if Mr. Johnson intones the Star Spangled Banner loudly enough, that obvious thought may be drowned out.

Will the public continue to buy the Administration line on the war? According to the Gallup Poll, the number of those who believe our involvement in Vietnam was a mistake has now risen to 49 percent. As the election approaches, the crucial question will become sharper: what are the alternatives? On this score much of the popular attitude will depend on how seriously people take Administration protestations that it has always stood ready to negotiate at any time and any place. Here Mr. Johnson and Secretary Rusk have been highly successful at obscuring matters for the hit-and-run reader, but if the war escalates again, can they keep it up? Can they, for instance, successfully deny the fact that they spent weeks "exploring" North Vietnam's most recent offer to negotiate instead of seizing the peace initiative immediately?

The day before U Thant returned from his efforts to sound out North Vietnam intentions, Secretary Rusk assured the country that Hanoi had no desire to negotiate, and Mr. Johnson followed that up by the declaration that he and his advisers had gone "as far as honorable men should go" in seeking peace—both moves quite obviously calculated to undercut U Thant's report. Nonetheless, the UN Secretary General put his prestige solidly on the other side of the proposition; in interview after interview he has reiterated that he is "more convinced than ever" that an unconditional end to the bombing of North Vietnam would swiftly produce serious peace negotiations. Sometime, surely, the American people will begin to take U Thant's assurances seriously, no matter how much the Administration pooh-poohs them.

The hitch on negotiations has always been the same. On both sides "saving face" is a key factor; everyone knows that "face" is of incalculable importance in Asia, but does this country not glory in the fact that we have never "lost" a war? Neither side feels the need to negotiate when winning, and neither side is willing to negotiate when losing. Only determined optimists now claim the United States is winning in Vietnam, but Mr. Johnson clearly remains persuaded that we must seek a military victory rather than a political settlement. If he wants to go to the negotiating table it is not to bargain but to accept a Vietcong surrender.

Even to long-time hawks, the newest Westmoreland request for additional men should make it clear that the Johnson way of military escalation spells continued disaster. Despite continued Administration rebuffs to U Thant, we again urge that the United States test his suggestions. "Face" or no, the most powerful nation on earth can afford to take the lead in seeking peace, and the United States should immediately stop the bombing and reduce its side of the war. There is, of course, a real possibility that this move will not now succeed; in the light of Administration dallying and recent Vietcong successes, there is genuine danger that this move may be too late. If this is so, however, and if the Vietcong intensify their efforts, we will know it soon enough. Given the possible end to slaughter on both sides, the risk is reasonable.

If the United States again rejects this possible path to peace and instead gives General Westmoreland all or most of the additional troops he is seeking, the Administration and the American people should be prepared for the worst. After Tet, even the most hard-headed in Washington must now admit that the NLF and the North Vietnamese have proven that we are not the only ones who can escalate. Their powerful friends, Russia and China, are clearly escalating their aid, and they can easily increase it still further, in Vietnam, in Korea or elsewhere. Russian tanks are appearing on the scene for the first time, and air reconnaissance is now reporting bombers in the hands of the North Vietnamese, also for the first time. American journalists write that Vietcong in the field are now armed with Soviet rockets, and effective attacks on our bases and airfields, and even on our ships off the coast, will probably multiply in the months ahead. On top of all this—and without even raising the possibility of Chinese "volunteers"—there is the fact that most of the forces our troops are fighting are still South Vietnamese, with the bulk of North Vietnam's regular army still uncommitted. If General Westmoreland wants 200,000 more troops now, how many additional men will he require if a quarter of a million fresh North Vietnamese troops cross the border?

In short, if the United States escalates again, rather than grasping the opportunity U Thant insists is still available, the war will almost certainly enter a vastly expanded phase, a phase in which the possibility of negotiations would be drastically reduced. It is for this reason that Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield urged an immediate end to the bombing, calling for "escalating our peace efforts" rather than our military involvement. It is for this reason that Senator Robert F. Kennedy said it was "immoral and intolerable to continue the way we are," warning the President that it would be a major mistake to escalate the war without the support of the Senate and the American people. It is for this reason too that Hue's Archbishop Pierre Ngo dinh Thuc, brother of the late premier Ngo dinh Diem, recently urged direct negotiations between North and South to end the war. It is late; indeed, the danger is that America has already missed the opportunity, that the Vietcong no longer seek negotiations and that we are committed to a wider and much more savage war. This would be a tragedy, for the Vietnamese and ourselves, but if it comes to pass and Mr. Johnson runs true to form, he will then invoke the memory of the sainted dead and blame not himself but his critics.

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PENNY WISE

In his state of the union message in 1962, President Kennedy stressed that the world was not meant to be a prison, where man endured his existence and awaited his execution. Mr. Kennedy spoke in the context of the arms race and nuclear weapons that promised, not security, but annihilation of humanity. "This nation has the will and the faith," he commented, "to make a supreme effort to break the logjam on disarmament and nuclear tests, and we will persist until we prevail, until the rule of law has replaced the ever dangerous use of force."

President Kennedy's organization for achieving this breakthrough was the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, another of those imaginative and practical new governmental departments that sprang up in the early 1960s. But even in the halcyon days of the Kennedy Administration this agency had a sort of second-class status, limping along with skeleton staff and skimpy budget. The Vietnam war has made a step-child of numerous agencies of government, but the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has been underprivileged and off-handedly treated since its earliest days. In 1963, for instance, the agency negotiated the historic treaty banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in space and under water; it was rewarded the following year with the lopping off of half its budget request by Congress, its operating fund being reduced to a paltry $7.5 million.

In the years since its founding, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has achieved some small growth. It now is a department of some 200 employees. But Congress' niggardly attitudes persist. Indeed, there is almost a penchant to reward agency achievement with fiscal penalty. Last week the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency negotiated agreement with Britain and Russia to defend nations renouncing nuclear weapons from nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail; in Washington, meanwhile, the House was trimming one year and $13 million from the agency's current budget request of $33 million for three years.

It is curious that in spite of its successes in negotiating test bans, hot line treaties and pacts to preserve outer space for peaceful purposes, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should have so dull an image. Perhaps there is something unglamorous and unattractive about a peace agency; perhaps a disarmament agency renders some people nervous. Whatever, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency just does not move people; the public seems to be forever looking for agency deficiencies in order to minimize agency attainments. And so it was with the recent non-nuclear nations defense pact.

Now admittedly that pact has its shortcomings. For one thing, it rings suspiciously of power politics, since a principal objective seems to be the exertion of a little reciprocal nuclear blackmail on Communist China. There are also the difficulties that France is not party to the agreement, and that the treaty nations pledge to take action through the United Nations Security Council, where five countries have a veto, including the comic opera state, Nationalist China—a detail, incidentally, which points up once again the need for UN Charter revision.

Yet, even though this latest nuclear agreement may be faulted, it fits strategically into a program for control of nuclear weapons, by encouraging non-nuclear nations to devote their nuclear research and energies to peaceful rather than military ends, an especially important objective given the increasing simplicity and economy with which nuclear weapons can be produced. A Neville Shute-*On the Beach* accident is suddenly too much within the realm of possibility for major nuclear powers not to be anxious to conclude nonproliferation pacts with small nations. As nuclear physicist Hans Bethe reminded an interviewer recently, containing the spread of nuclear weapons to small nations is essential to any effective program of arms control and, hopefully, general disarmament.

The urgency of arms control in a nuclear age is so self-evident that for Congress to economize at the expense of the specific governmental agency in business to devise control becomes something of a travesty. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency merits more than moral support; it must also have the funds to do its work. A problem is that an agency engaged in arms control and disarmament is always an easy target of economizers, and never more so than when the government is itself caught up in a shooting war. But such economies, in the long run, are foolhardy. Not only do they put the government at cross-purposes with itself by diluting ideals of peace for the exaltation, directly or indirectly, of the militarism the government aspires to contain; they also hobble actual arms control projects. For example, the funds that were trimmed by the House from the latest Arms Control and

NEXT WEEK

Daniel Callahan assesses the interpretations of the Church lately put forward by Hans Küng, Rosemary Ruether and Charles Davis:

"Küng leaves [the reality of the Church] thoroughly indeterminate, buried away somewhere under layers of scholarship, paradox, reformist zeal and hope."

"Dr. Ruether's analysis is singular and appealing, but her desire to see the Church recover a lost eschatological innocence strains my credulity."

"Davis' contribution to ecclesiology would have been magnificent had he been systematically materialistic. But even his vision of the Church ultimately disappears in a spiritual fog."

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Disarmament Agency's budget request were earmarked for field testing verification concepts, a vital development in any program of arms control.

The cut should be eliminated. And something should also be done about brightening the image and broadening the acceptance of the agency which just might be the most important one in government.

Balkanized Marxism And Red Separatism

East European events of the past few weeks have made dissidence almost fashionable among Communist states, and within those states. During the conference of 67 Communist parties in Budapest, called to discuss plans for a party summit later this year in Moscow, the Rumanians loudly complained that the Soviets were seeking to reimpose a semblance of ideological conformity on the Communist bloc. Eventually they walked out of the conference, reasserting the now sacrosant right of each Communist state to follow its own independent road to socialism.

And yet this same Rumania, so adamant and balky at the Budapest ideological conclave, the week before sent no less a person than First Party Secretary Nicolae Ceausescu to Sofia, Bulgaria, for the Warsaw Pact meeting of the seven member states of the Soviet alliance system in Eastern Europe. The Rumanians were pointedly stressing that while they would not follow Moscow's ideological line, and would not take part in anathematizing Maoist China or any Communist party, they are willing to work with the Soviet Union on the government level in matters of mutual national interest.

For its part, the wizened Soviet team of Brezhnev and Kosygin seems inclined to accept the disintegration of Stalin's colonial empire so long as the vital interests of the Russian state were not trampled on in the process. Of course, it remains to be seen whether a stable compromise can be reached between the imperatives of Soviet power and the increasingly assertive East European nationalisms.

The triumphant nationalism of the East European Communist states has not only destroyed Marxist ideological unity, but is sparking the revival of national frictions and irredentism in the area. Thus, Sofia last month suddenly reasserted the old Bulgarian claims to Balkan hegemony during celebrations of the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano that gave Bulgaria Yugoslav Macedonia, parts of Serbia and northern Greece. Had the great powers allowed the treaty to stand, Bulgaria would have emerged as the dominant Balkan power. The Albanians, who are pro-Chinese because they are anti-Serbian, are again claiming the Yugoslav autonomous region of Kosmet where a million Albanians live. And within Yugoslavia the Croat and Slovene Communists are demanding the restructuring of the country on federated lines so that each Yugoslav republic would control its own army and economy. In the meantime, Ceausescu has revived the Rumanian claims to Bessarabia and Bukovina incorporated into the Soviet Union by Stalin, and Budapest is advancing claims to Rumanian Transylvania which has a substantial Hungarian minority.

And yet the national independence of the East European states is the essential prerequisite for the evolution of the Communist dictatorships towards socialist democracy, or to use the term currently fashionable in Eastern Europe, Marxist humanism, advocated by such revisionist ideologues as Poland's Adam Schaff and Yugoslavia's Rudi Supek. Yugoslavia's nationalistic defiance of Stalin in 1948 inevitably led to the gradual relaxation of the internal dictatorship, the collapse of intellectual conformism, an agreement with the Vatican granting a greater measure of freedom to the Catholic Church, and the opening of Yugoslavia to Western tourists and ideas. Similarly, the Polish October of 1956, which proclaimed Polish national independence, led to a greater degree of religious and intellectual liberty, despite some subsequent backtracking.

The recent downfall of Russian puppet Antonin Novotny in Czechoslovakia has been followed by a more independent foreign policy line in Prague, the ouster of ideological inquisitor Jeri Hendrych, and the publication recently in *Literarni Listy* of an article by the intellectual Alexander Kliment openly calling for the establishment of political democracy, free elections, the formation of a legal opposition and a policy of active neutralism in international affairs. Now the defection of Novotny supporter General Jan Sejna to the U.S. may spur new party secretary Alexander Dubcek to purge the encrusted Stalinists from the bureaucracy.

The Communist leaders are, of course, aware that complete independence from the Soviet Union is both unrealistic because of the prevailing world power balance and undesirable from their own point of view, because it might encourage radical internal upheavals that would destroy the new bureaucratic ruling class. As a result, the general tendency of the East European regimes is, as London School of Economics Professor Ghita Ionescu has pointed out, toward a sort of "Communist neutralism," which implies an "East European Communist regrouping . . . which would differentiate the parties and the countries of Eastern Europe from and protect them against the Great Power, Soviet Russia."

Such a regrouping would permit the East European states to draw closer to Western Europe, particularly to those nations that are not part of the U.S. military defense system, or are opposed to it, such as Austria, Sweden, Finland and France. The establishment of a broad transitional zone separating the U.S. and the Soviet Union,

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would in turn diminish the prospects of a nuclear confrontation of the superpowers on the European continent.

The slow, evolutionary freeing of the East European states from Soviet economic and political domination and interference may enable the rising generation of pragmatic Communist politicians gradually to dismantle the dictatorships and come to terms with their peoples, and without endangering their personal power or conjuring up violent revolutionary upheavals that would almost inevitably occur if the process of change were too rapid.

MATTHEW M. MESTROVIC

(Mr. Mestrovic is an Assistant Professor of European History at Fairleigh Dickinson University in New Jersey.)

Biafra, New Target For Genocide

The people of Biafra are convinced they face extinction at the hands of their tribal and religious enemies. What may be worse, they are convinced that the Western world in general and their Christian brothers in particular are indifferent to their fate.

Whether they are right in thinking they are threatened with annihilation only their enemies know. But there can be little doubt that the Western world has shown very little interest in the fate of the 13 million or so people of the fledgling Republic of Biafra, as it calls itself (or of Eastern Nigeria, as it is known to the Nigerian federal government, whose troops are fighting to keep it in the federation).

The three days that I spent recently in Biafra have sufficed to convince me that the people there believe the federal troops mean to wipe them out, or at least kill the educated classes which have been the strength of Biafra's people. The intellectuals themselves—and there are many such in Biafra, which probably has the highest educational level in Black Africa—speak of a "war of annihilation" and even of genocide. The others say simply, "They want to kill us all."

You hear that refrain all over Biafra (it's about the size of Kentucky, and I was able to traverse it from south to north in a day): "They want to kill us all." You hear it from waiters and shopkeepers, hotel clerks and bishops. You hear it most often, because you meet them most often, from the militiamen and boys and girls of civil defense who man roadblocks every few miles in Biafra, even in the deepest bush country.

When you ask them why they think this, they seldom point to the massacre of 30,000 of them in the Northern region about a year and a half ago. (This was the massacre that sent well over a million Ibo tribesmen fleeing from all over Nigeria back into their ancestral homeland in the East, where they declared the Republic of Biafra last May.) They talk instead of what happened when federal troops marched into the town of Asaba, just across the Niger river from Onitsha, Biafra's market center and the biggest market in the whole of West Africa. They'll tell you that every male Ibo over the age of 12 was murdered.

For the most part, federal troops who have entered Biafran territory (they have invaded on four main fronts) have been leaving the other tribesmen of Biafra alone. This emphasizes the principal weakness of the case for Biafra: it is largely a creation of the Ibo tribesmen who make up about two-thirds of the 13 or 14 million Biafrans. The Biafran government has made elaborate provision for the inclusion of other tribesmen in the government (the minister of agriculture, for example, is an Efik) and for the self-administration of the minority tribes in their own areas. The Biafran minister of the interior, Christopher Mojekwu, told me that the "so-called minority problem has disappeared." My own inquiries on the spot convinced me that his statement was an exaggeration, but only an exaggeration. The situation has improved remarkably since my last visit to that part of the world a year ago. The Biafrans know that their attempt to form a republic can founder on the rocks of a discontented minority.

Tribal problems in fact bedevil what remains of the Federation of Nigeria. Biafra's chief of state, Colonel C. O. Ojukwu, said he expected the Nigerian federation to break up under its tribal tensions. He said this would only be "a matter of months."

Even with a relatively small territory Biafra remains one of the biggest countries in Africa in its population. An exact census will have to await the end of the present war, but the 13 or 14 million Biafrans put it third in Black Africa, right after what's left of Nigeria and after Ethiopia. Its population is about as large as that of the former Belgian Congo, twice as large as Ghana's, and ten times as large as Liberia's.

Its economic resources are almost unlimited. Most valuable of all is the primary resource of population. The Biafrans, especially the Ibos, are dynamic, ambitious, keen businessmen and eager seekers after education. Their family ties are exceedingly strong and stretch far outside the family circle as Europeans and Americans know it. In fact, the so-called extended family system enabled the million and more Ibo refugees to be absorbed into Biafra without dislocating the economy. They simply sought out their relatives, however distant, and got food, shelter, and a new start in life.

Biafra's oil deposits are believed to be enormous. Until the war began last July, Biafra produced two-thirds of all the oil in Nigeria. Big companies like Shell and Mobil had been busily prospecting the interior and the offshore shelf, and some of the prospectors were so optimistic they referred to the area as a new Persian Gulf.

Potentially it is the richest country in West Africa. Some people claim that is why Biafra has broken away from Nigeria; others claim that is why the rest of Nigeria is so

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anxious to bring the rebellious region back into the federation. Foreign investors had found the region a very profitable field into which to plow their money: the annual rate of economic growth was a fantastic 10 per cent. The Biafran government wants foreign investment, but at present there's no way to get goods into Biafra or out of it. The federal navy has imposed a highly effective blockade. Biafra is very much on its own, and has taken to producing its own table salt from seawater, coffee from grains, and flour from yams.

Arms and essential spare parts come in by plane from Lisbon over a route that's crooked as a dog's hind leg in order to avoid flying over countries belonging to the Organization for African Unity. I flew in and out on one of these planes, a postwar prop-job that looked like a railway freight car inside and was not noticeably more comfortable. We flew into Biafra and out of it by night to avoid the still less comfortable experience of being shot down.

What impressed me most in Biafra was the perfect order of the place. Biafra is not another Congo, where law broke down and the professional people were somehow submerged. I was very sceptical when, the day after my arrival, Colonel Ojukwu claimed that the country's army was being filled by volunteers, that it was being fed by food donated by the people and even cooked by them, and that it was being clothed by tailors who made up government-issue cloth as a patriotic gesture and without recompense. Upon checking, I learned that far from exaggerating, he was understating the case. Volunteers who have been turned away from the recruiting booths have on occasion rioted. Army transport vehicles are given to the government by the owners, who often volunteer as drivers as well. There is no tax to support the war; civil defense funds collected in each town and village on a purely voluntary basis have filled the war coffers to overflowing.

In the midst of all this, most of the normal government services are functioning. The welfare departments are giving more help than before the war (and more help is needed because of the refugees who have swelled the population by almost ten per cent). Even the roads are being repaved. What is disquieting, however, is the suspension of all education save that in the seminaries.

The Catholic Church has risen in the popular esteem (where it was high enough already) by the determination of the missioners to stay on the job despite the dangers. This can be said of the other missionary churches, although these missioners feel more pressure to leave Biafra in order to protect their families. The danger that the federal troops will break through remains real.

With this danger hanging over them, the Biafran people have been looking more and more to the Catholic Church for a way to survive. The Church is in a very delicate position; it cannot appear to be taking sides, although missioners on the spot believe the possibility of mass slaughter to be real. Happily, what the Church is best able to do in this situation will not compromise her position as "mother of all." It is also what the Biafrans most want of her. And that is to help bring about negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the war and its causes. For months the Church has been working toward this, both publicly and behind the scenes. PATRICK RILEY

(Patrick Riley is a journalist based at the NC News Service office in Rome.)

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MUDDIED AMERICAN MESSIANISM

I was recently told of a man, a professor of philosophy, who has said to friends that unless something happens to change American foreign policy and end the war in Vietnam he believes that he will commit suicide. This is a shocking, a neurotically intense, expression of an attitude which is not uncommon in the United States; a moral interlocking of private identity with the public policy of government.

Clearly there is private commitment or private grief involved in the political controversies of other countries, but even in so highly politicized societies as those of Europe there is also a redeeming distinction understood to exist between government—an impermanent arrangement or civil institution—and nation. There is a difference between *la république* and *la patrie,* between empire and fatherland. France and Germany are "eternal" —but there have been five French republics and two empires since 1789, a German empire, a fascist *reich,* and two German republics (three, to include the East German republic) since 1870. The Italian people are immortal, but "Italy" was invented in 1870. Only Britain, with its continuity and evolution of government, is very close to us in identifying political with national identity, and even there it is not really the same.

America is different because this nation has no historical existence outside the constitutional government. The federal constitution is the *raison d'être* of the American nation. It is theoretically conceivable that the American people could move to Central Asia or the Australian outback, taking along the American constitution, never losing our identity as a nation. I don't mean that there is no loyalty to the land as land, but what is unimaginable to Americans is that the constitution could be discarded and replaced with some other form of gov-

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ernment without a crippling discrediting of the meaning of American nationhood.

This land was empty; we came and created a form of government which repudiated the old forms of Europe. We recruited a huge population whose sole link was a new kind of political commitment. Thus the intense public patriotism, the pledges of allegiance and loyalty oaths, the barrage of political self-congratulation which distinguishes American life. These arise from an instinctive sense of the narrowness of this national base of ours. We have needed to indoctrinate newcomers and constantly reassure ourselves about our unity. It has been understood that if this form of government fails, we fail; it is all we have. What would we be without the constitution? To most Europeans such a question would be unintelligible. A Greek or a Serb is under no misapprehension that the fate of King Constantine's monarchy or President Tito's popular republic could ever jeopardize their nationhood.

The political skepticism and cynicism of the American people then has had a clear limit. Town Hall may be crooked and politicians liars, but this popular belief coexists with a larger allegiance which is beyond all questioning: to a political document and the ideas it expresses, but also to a form of civil conduct and economic individualism which have come to be associated with those ideas. This commitment has always borne an intensity far more than political.

If, then, an Administration in Washington seems shallow or stupid—or to practice "immoral" policies—Americans react with a sense of personal diminishment. Quite unpolitical people can today be heard to say that they feel hurt, or humiliated, or "unclean," or angrily impotent, because of our policies—or setbacks—in Vietnam. There is more than patriotism in this. A personal jeopardy, an undermining of personal identity and meaning, is felt. It is quite a different thing from the anger of left-wing Frenchmen at the colonial policies of the Fourth Republic, or of right-wing Frenchmen at the Fifth Republic. It is closer to the grief of Frenchmen or Poles in 1940—when their *land* was conquered. But no Frenchman or Pole, I think, wept in the streets, to say nothing of contemplating suicide, over the meanness or folly of French or Polish foreign policy in the 1930's.

Where other states have tended to see foreign relations as national aggrandizement, or defense, or a series of practical arrangements for getting along with societies which have autonomous existences and independent destinies, we have seen other people in a process of development toward our own happy condition, and our foreign policies have come to seem the method by which we help them in this progress (or fight off the challenges to progress). Our foreign policies have become a crucial projection of our own values and belief—and an unacknowledged test of what we believe.

This, I think, has created a very considerable danger. Failure abroad may not be seen as the failure of a replaceable Administration, but—to the extent that American foreign policy has come to express essential American political assumptions—it may be understood as a failure of the American political idea. And today, in Vietnam, and in less dramatic ways in other places, failure seems to me a certainty.

We have already seen one kind of impact of Vietnam on our domestic society, the translation to America of the categories of the Vietnamese war. Believing that Vietnam is a struggle of values, a struggle of general significance for the contemporary world, we conclude that our struggles at home must reflect the same issues. Thus the militants of the Left who identify with the Viet Cong, and the militants of the Right (and National Guard officers and police chiefs) who foresee "guerrilla war" and "insurrection" at home—artillery in Harlem, gunships over Watts.

But more important is that failure in Vietnam may seem a bewildering failure of democratic foreign policy, of the power and value of the American idea, of the simple beliefs which have motivated us in Vietnam—our positive motives, not our fears. Thus, in a recent television interview, an agricultural aid advisor in the Mekong Delta said that he had believed that if we could make the peasants prosperous they would resist Communism. He looked around in bafflement (as the camera panned the ruins of Cantho) and said that he must have been wrong; that he couldn't understand it. One can argue that this naive faith in prosperity—this simple economic determinism—was unspeakably foolish to begin with, but it (and its political counterpart: if we give the peasants votes and a parliament they will reject the Viet Cong) has been the deeply-felt working rationale of large numbers of Americans in Vietnam, and of even larger numbers here at home—including some at the very peak of government and of the professional policy community.

If Vietnam discredits this, what happens to America's faith in itself? I must say that I am not at all sure of the answer. It may be that we will simply repress the experience, the scar, and nothing serious will happen. There may be a creative and serious response, a reappraisal and redirection of policy and government assumptions which will influence and redirect public attitudes. (American messianism was—after all—directed inwards, isolationist, until the 1940s; it is only in the last 30 years that there has emerged a popular conviction that we can and should actively intervene throughout the world to inculcate our values and forms of politics and economics.) It may also be that failure in Vietnam, especially if it is accompanied by mounting failures and social breakdown in our cities, could produce a real crisis of national faith and national self-confidence. In that case, the result could bitterly strain the one commitment which holds this country together, the commitment to constitutional government.

WILLIAM PFAFF

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FREE WORLD FASCISM

South Korea purges its intellectuals

CZARINA WILPERT AND PETER STEINFELS



Until the Pueblo affair there had been little American public concern for recent events in South Korea. Our strongest ally in Vietnam, with 50,000 troops, merited a small flurry of news items on the economic success of the Seoul regime last spring before the Korean presidential elections. Korea, some observers pointed out, was a happy precedent for what the U.S. could do in Vietnam. When, shortly after the elections, Korean President Chung Hee Park began clapping his opponents in jail, the American press was considerably less interested. And the recent trial of 34 Korean intellectuals for treason, though it merited a few paragraphs in *Time,* slipped easily into that part of the American unconscious where we file away nasty things occurring in Spain, Haiti, Brazil, and other peculiar corners of what official jargon terms the "free world."

If the recent tragi-comedy in Moscow was a joint production by Gogol and Kafka, the Korean script was written by Ian Fleming. Definitely up-to-date. In the last week of June, 1967, Korean students and professors living overseas suddenly disappeared from their host countries to turn up shortly afterward in South Korean prisons. Seventeen disappeared from West Germany, eight from France, at least one from Austria and three were brought from the United States. The charge against them, and others who were rounded up at home: espionage. The specifics: they had taken money from the North Korean Embassy in East Berlin; traveled to East Berlin and Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea; read North Korean propaganda material; and attempted to win South Koreans living in Europe to the Communist cause and the reunification formula of the North.

The removal operation was, and remains, highly mysterious. Needless to say, reports concerning the number of Koreans involved, etc., often conflict. Still, some things are known. It is clear, for example, that a large number of agents of the Seoul secret service (known officially as the South Korean C.I.A.)—some say 20, others 50—arrived unannounced in West Germany and contacted their targets. It is also clear that, contrary to certain statements of the South Korean government, not all the suspects left of "their own free will." Certain students who were allowed, after preliminary investigation, to return to Europe back Seoul's assertions, but others explained their departure as due to "moral pressure." One managed to escape the agent at the airport before boarding his flight home. *Time* referred to "threats against their relatives or offers of lighter sentences." The official South Korean statements made in reply to West German protests as much as admitted that some suspects had been forced to leave.

Bonn and Paris both protested what amounted to political kidnapping. But because of the greater number taken from Germany, and perhaps because France itself has been known to dabble in this sort of activity, the Federal Republic harbored the liveliest reaction. A student pamphlet first exposed the events; 149 professors at the University of Frankfurt sent a protest to West German Chancellor Kiessinger; the Rector and university senate at Heidelberg did the same; the Rector of the University of Giessen has refused to accept any more South Korean students until the matter is set straight.

In the period during and since the trial of these Koreans, the German press, groups like the League of the Rights of Man at Munich, and certain student groups

CZARINA WILPERT, *now living in West Germany, was associated with both the U.S. and International Young Christian Students.* PETER STEINFELS *is an associate editor of* Commonweal *presently living in Paris.*

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have kept the issue alive. During a Bundestag public information debate, certain parliamentarians threatened rupture of diplomatic relations with Seoul if the "kidnapped" South Koreans were not returned. The German government has cut plans for future development aid programs, though funds for existing programs continue to be available. Kiessinger's government, on the other hand, would evidently like the flurry to quiet down. Bonn's ambassador to Seoul returned to report to the government only in January, six months after the initial storm. There has been to date no public release of his briefings, nor for that matter of the analysis of West Germany's official observer at the trial.

The Germans may have particular cause to be upset. As if it weren't enough that the Federal Republic is known as the "playground of the world's secret services," the South Korean operation looks like a new kind of team game. Just how the Korean agents entered Germany and how the suspects were taken out (many left passports behind) is an object of great curiosity. No official proof has been produced, nor has any official denial been given. But the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* highly authoritative, politically middle of-the-road, and enjoying many contacts in the Bonn government, has published reports stating that the South Korean agents, traveling on diplomatic passports, entered Germany at American military bases. The suspects seemed to have been flown out through civil airports. But, without passports? This would have required the complicity of someone in the German government. The chief of the federal intelligence service, who has since resigned, denied any involvement by his organization. But other Germans, struck by the rapidity and ease with which the South Koreans were contacted and "transferred," linked the event to a rumor that German intelligence had in effect prepared the way by locating and keeping the accused under surveillance before the kidnapping.

Doubts for Fair Trial

Anger over this do-it-yourself extradition might have been considerably less if European observers had much faith in the likelihood of the Korean intellectuals' receiving a fair trial. There were a number of good reasons for their doubts.

1. Intellectuals and students, especially those who have lived abroad, play a major role in South Korea's domestic opposition, and the South Korean government tends to consider all opposition as Communist or Communist-inspired. Since the Communists display solidarity with any opposition forces, the Chung Hee Park regime is only reinforced in its view. The North Korean campaign of harassment and infiltration of the South has stimulated an already present anti-Communist paranoia in Seoul.

2. This attitude is translated into South Korea's laws. The 1961 anti-Communist law, for example, outlaws such things as any contact with Communists, any positive report about North Korea, any action in favor of reunification or better relations with the North. The national security law considers "any organization which hurts the government" as an "enemy of the state." All sending of mail or travel to the North is illegal. Since the opposition desires more contact with the North—postal service, sports and information exchange, etc.—and since intellectual milieux abroad do not quarantine Communists in quite the way the Park government does, it is not difficult to run afoul of these laws. The president of the South Korean student organization in Germany pointed out the dilemma of his fellow students: "Practically anyone who has taken the train to West Berlin through the Eastern zone is considered a Communist."

3. Finally, South Korean investigatory and prison practices are hardly considered regular. One Korean here claimed that five years imprisonment is as serious as a life term because of the physical punishment. A West German publication reported that sources close to the Korean secret service talk of another student (not one of the 17) who was shipped to Korea, but whose case will never come to trial; he will simply remain in prison. The Protestant weekly *Christ Und Welt* noted that the trial defendants spoke of the "difficult atmosphere" of the investigation. No one charged torture; but rumors in Seoul mentioned beatings and the use of electric shock techniques. The German foreign office sent a Bonn law professor, Gerhard Grünwald, to observe the proceedings; in his interviews with the prisoners, no discussion of their treatment was allowed. Grünwald's impression of the prisoner's hardships became clear upon his return; he suggested that German students hold a drive for food, warm clothing and blankets for the prisoners who are living in unheated cells during this cold Korean winter.

As for the trial itself, reports here were scanty. The announcement of the verdict and the sentences shocked the Germans: two death sentences, one for a respected former physicist at Frankfurt University, the other for a Seoul University professor; four life sentences, including one for the most prominent Korean contemporary composer, Yun I-sang. (During the trials, the Bonner Stadtheatre gave a premiere of one of his operas.) Only three of the accused were acquitted; the remaining 25 received prison terms from 5 months to 15 years. According to reports of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* the two death sentences, the life imprisonments and the sentences of 15 years rested on the following charges: visits to North Korea, reception of money from the North, trips to East Berlin, communication to the Communists of general information about South Koreans living in Europe, recruitment for Communism, and the use of secret codes. The proof came substantially from the statements of the accused themselves. The charge of spying was denied, however, by the defendants, who also gave various

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reasons for visiting the North, ranging from simple curiosity to the desire to visit relatives. Only one of the accused was shown to be a member of the Communist party. In spite of the sensational round-up—194 persons were under suspicion, 64 of them to face charges in two separate trials—no Communist underground has been discovered in South Korea and none of the accused were found guilty of betraying any government secrets.

The legal question is thus left shrouded. According to some reports, there were no direct references to specific laws broken at the trial. The public prosecutor held that espionage must be understood broadly enough to apply to all actions that could be of advantage to the North. Professor Grünwald, apparently applying a different criterion, stated, "It was definitely not espionage." It seems that South Korea's official notion of what it means to betray one's country, like that of the Soviet Union and many other nations, is much more extended than ours.

According to Thomas Ross in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, an influential member of the opposition in Seoul claims that "when one takes the anti-Communist and national security laws seriously all 30 million inhabitants of South Korea could be punished under the law." Ross, speaking of his travels in South Korea, reports on the numerous checkpoints, police watches and military controls, the midnight curfew, wire tapping and censorship of the mails. The press seems a little more independent: the Korean *Times* wrote in December, in relation to Human Rights Week: "various segments of our society are even today mistreated; innocent citizens are often arrested without believable, solid evidence and inhumanly beaten."

A complete and categoric judgment on the trial is impossible because of the absence of sufficient first-hand reports as well as the currency in Korea of secret and illegal procedures. As in the Ginzburg case in Russia, the issue is complicated because the Korean intellectuals were not tried for their intellectual works but for alleged contact with the enemy. In both cases, an added factor was certainly present: the government's desire to overawe any opposition, an opposition which is considered as tantamount to treason. Finally, no matter how relativist one might be about the possibility of democratic liberties in conflict-ridden lands, two facts cry for protest: the heavy penalties, including death, handed out in such a doubtful matter; and the interference with the security of foreigners residing in Western nations which are committed to non-Korean standards of freedom.

All in all, the Korean affair damages our myth of the "free world." It would be hypocrisy, of course, to pretend that dictatorial laws, irregular police practices and the equation of opposition with treason are limited to places like South Korea. Indeed, there may be a few French intellectuals—though far fewer than the stereotype would have it—ready to protest what occurs in Athens, Madrid or Seoul while they "understand" what passes for justice in Moscow, Havana or Cairo. For Americans, however, the tendency is precisely the opposite. Whatever is not Communist is "free." President Johnson speaks of the "free-world economy," which presumably includes South Africa and Portugal. Despite fascism in Greece, terror in Guatemala, reaction in the Dominican Republic, and now the round-up of intellectuals in South Korea, the myth persists that freedom flourishes in the wake of American anti-Communist intervention.

A rationalist, a mystic and a vulgarian

LOISY, TYRRELL AND SULLIVAN

KENNETH REXROTH

John Ratté's book, *Three Modernists* (Sheed & Ward, $6.95), is one to which a good many people have been looking forward since it was first announced. Ratté has made a specialty of the study of the evolution of liberal, radical, progressive and modernist Catholicism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Presumably he knows as much about the subjects—plural: each one of these adjectives refers to a different school of thought, a different group of men—as anybody now writing. Yet this is not the book I for one had hoped for. Perhaps it is the generation gap. Ratté makes it all seem very remote. Although he would certainly say he was most sympathetic with Loisy, Tyrrell and Sullivan, here is a case where that infinitely misused term "empathy" can be used correctly. Ratté just doesn't seem to have much *einfühling*, much visceral identification, with the gut agonies of his subjects. The fact that he treats all three men more or less as equals, and as more or less the same kind of "modernists" is sufficient proof of his lack of deep feeling for them. They were actually very unlike, and Sullivan is as remote as can be from the other two.

KENNETH REXROTH'S *most recent book is* An Autobiographical Novel *(Doubleday).*

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Loisy was a late-born member of the French Enlightenment, a rationalist of the orthodox school. When he left the Church, this is what he became, and it is the last lingering descendants of Voltaire, Tom Paine and Robert Ingersoll who read him today. For all his connections with German Higher Criticism of the Gospels, he was utterly French. In France the Church is, even today, a social institution, with roots that sink deep through the centuries and millenia to, not just Roman or Gallic times, but to the mysteries of the caves of the Dordogne, the rites of passage and of the year, that subtly reshape the ceremonies of the Church in remote villages in the Massif Central—but which also still determine the kind and quality of devotion in St. Severin, the parish of the most radical intellectuals, in Paris. It is the almost instinctual urge to preserve the special *tremendum* which haunts French society at its most significant moments that is responsible for the Goddess of Reason enthroned on the altar at Notre Dame by the Revolution, the High Church rituals of the Comteans, and even for the ceremonial sins of Baudelaire, Gourmont and Huysmans. Had Loisy been left to his own devices, and not been forced to quit the Church, he would have become the apostle of a ritualistic, agnostic, intensely chauvinistic, social cultus, very like Japanese Shinto in the years just before World War Two. Neither the evangelical Jesus, in all ways made like unto us, nor the prayer life of the Catholic mystics, nor the re-creation of a specifically Christian philosophy, like the Fathers of the Church or the modern Russians, meant much to Loisy. It is precisely these aspects of the Church, as well as its Ultramontane political structure, that he wished to do away with.

Sullivan is not relevant, except to show in what a distorting mirror English and French modernism appeared in the United States. Both Loisy and Tyrrell were among the least vulgar of modern religious thinkers, and Von Hügel was so refined he was inaccessible to almost all his contemporaries in the Church (which is probably the real reason he was not condemned). Sullivan was what is wrong with the Church—any contemporary Christian church in America—pushed to its logical conclusions. He was shockingly vulgar. Ratté quotes some pretty embarrassing things from his published and unpublished writings, but he apparently assumes that no one is likely to go back and read Sullivan. Try it. You can find his novel in most big libraries. Queasy is a mild term for the reaction to a full dose of William L. Sullivan. I suppose he does represent one tendency in modern Catholicism—that tendency which has produced a liturgy in the language of the luncheon clubs and a confessional modeled on Dear Abby. What is modern about it? This we have always with us. Bingo. Many sincere men believe that if you can just talk the language of a spiritually famished society dominated by the cash nexus and with TV tastes, you can convert that society, or at least nibble around its edges. I believe this is a grave error, due to the fact that the clergy simply cannot communicate at all with the socially alienated and corrupted except in the most catastrophic emergencies. Jive liturgies and rock masses mimic, they do not communicate. Sullivan doesn't mimic —he is a natural born Babbitt.

Father George Tyrrell is a different kettle of fish altogether. His life was centered on prayer. He was blest with a soul of exceptional natural nobility. His primary vocation was pastoral—as confessor and spiritual counselor. Everything he wrote was shaped by the passionate concern of a contemplative for the cure of souls, and it cannot be understood properly if divorced from that living context. He was also the only man in the entire movement of reform, from Acton to the American Paulists, who was manifestly what the Church, if it had not expelled him, would have called a saint. Loisy is reasonable, Sullivan is rhetorical, Tyrrell is passionate, and these qualities are applied by each specifically to the love of God and the love of man. Loisy and Sullivan are chauvinists, Sullivan not a little crazy on the subject; Tyrrell never gives up a mystical quest for the City of God. Even after he was expelled, some of the most sensitive and acute religious intelligences in England, both Roman Catholic and Anglican, continued to go to Father Tyrrell for spiritual counsel, if not confession. I can imagine going to confession to either Sullivan or Loisy only on a stormy night when far from home and heavy burdened.

Undertone of Depreciation

One of the most annoying things about Ratté's book is its constant slight, subtle undertone of depreciation of both Loisy and Tyrrell—especially Tyrrell—but not of Sullivan. Ratté is the master of the gently pejorative adjective, and of the innocent quotation *en déshabillé*. Or is this what the book is all about? Is the inclusion of Sullivan with these two large-souled, richly cultivated men, a delicate exercise in vulgarization by association? Again, both Loisy and Tyrrell are judged by what they became after they were expelled. This is manifestly unjust. Tyrrell lived on only a short while, and always in great mental pain, and he certainly never ceased to think of himself, except in brief moments of despair, as anything but a Roman Catholic. He never even showed any interest in returning to the Anglicanism from which he had come, and where he had hundreds of followers and many more sympathizers. Loisy was no different than countless French priests, from Suger of Brabant to today, who are devout Catholic skeptics.

Most important, it is extremely unjust to portray the modernist movement as an attack on the Church. It was exactly the opposite. It was an attempt to construct a new defense, which would answer the modern challenger, in terms he could understand. The modernists were acutely aware that Darwin, Freud, William James, Einstein, or even James Joyce, defined a universe of discourse which

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lay outside that defined by the opponents of St. Thomas, and that the old apologetic was simply not relevant. (I don't of course mean that they had heard of all these individuals, some of whom came to public notice after their time.) Tyrrell and Von Hügel conceived of this apologetic as founded on a specifically Christian philosophy, something which had not existed in the main tradition of the Western Church since Origen and St. Clement—who did not belong to the Western Church. It is interesting to compare the first tentative steps of the modernists toward a Christian, not a Christianized, philosophy, with the normal development of Russian philosophy from the beginnings to Berdyaev. What seemed an adventure into unexplored territory to them was just the accepted and familiar field of Russian Orthodox thought. This, obviously, is due to the abiding power of the tradition of the Fathers of the Church in Orthodoxy.

So likewise, it was in Anglicanism that the modernists met with their greatest response, and precisely because the Anglo-Catholic movement since the days of Keble, Pusey and Newman, had been founded on two rocks—one of which was the Apostolic and Patristic Christian world view. The other was the interpretation of the Christian experience as the experience of Christ—what His experience was, and what others experienced when their lives touched His. Even Loisy, who was hardly a mystic, realized that this meant, beyond Christology and the analysis of texts, the living experience of the Christian community, the fellowship of the Christian experience. As Wittgenstein used to say of philosophy, "What do we do when we *do* Christianity?" On this hangs all the law and the prophets—but the first and great commandment and the second that is like unto it are forms of prayer, and this Father Tyrrell, counselor of seekers, never forgot.

Exegesis, philosophy, liturgics, the concerns of aggiornamento bear little resemblance to those of the modernists of the beginning of the century. Roman Catholicism dropped them, and passed them by, and has come at the basic dilemmas by quite different routes. Not so with Anglicanism. The documents of modern Anglo-Catholic theology and apologetics are not just deeply indebted to Tyrrell and Von Hügel; they are all part of one steadily developing tradition. The most reliable historian of Catholic modernism is the Anglican Alec Vidler, quoted often by John Ratté, and in his books Bishop Charles Gore, Father Thornton, Bishop Weston, *Essays Catholic and Critical,* A. E. Taylor, and the rest, march along in order with Tyrrell and Von Hügel, nobody breaking ranks in the development of a contemporary Catholic apologetic which has grown up alongside, and quite independent of, the leaders of the world of post-Vatican II. Last Advent season, while considering this review, I read through once again Father Tyrrell's meditations on the Spirit of Christ and the Prayer of Christ, *Lex Credendi.* This is Tyrrell at the high point, spiritually, of his career, and it is certainly meaningful still in a way that much of the New Theology is not, and it is certainly intensely, inexpungibly, Catholic.

It seems to me that there are two drives operating today, two contradictory definitions of aggiornamento. One is the now long-dead Liberal Protestantism, which is given lip service in the luncheon clubs and all the forums of the Social Lie, the apotheosis of spiritual vulgarity. If this wins, it means the end of Catholicism, Christianity, religion, all interiority. The other is simply a more developed concept of prayer, and the opening of all life to its pervasiveness. This is not new at all, but patristic, apostolic, evangelical—or if you will, a clarification of the religious experience as such, so that it might be shared by all men, today. Father Tyrrell and Baron Von Hügel were among the first to be acutely aware of this antithesis in modern religion. It is obvious which side they chose, which is why they are so desperately relevant today.

Racial tensions in Britain

'NO COLOURED NEED APPLY'

WILLIAM B. GOULD

"If you were a shade darker it would be all right. But I wouldn't advise you to go looking for restaurants in that area." That was a railroad employee's response to my attempt to find some good Indian curry in Bradford's Lumb Lane, the "ghetto" into which a large portion of that city's "coloured" immigrants are crowded.

In Bradford, a Yorkshire wool and textile center, the Industrial Revolution's factories still stand; to them have come 14,000 colored workers, making up, in part, for a shortage of indigenous labor. Bradford's colored population is mostly Indian and Pakistani rather than West Indian (the word "coloured"—which is now used interchangeably with "immigrant"—is defined by the British

WILLIAM B. GOULD *spent a year in the London School of Economics and has served as an attorney-advisor in the labor field.*

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as referring to all three of these groups). It is estimated that there are one million coloreds throughout the country, or 2 percent of the total population. Because most immigrants are at child-bearing ages, that percentage promises to increase.

Undoubtedly, the immediate cause for the type of remark quoted above was a wildcat strike by Indian and Pakistani workers at the woolcombing firm of Robinson and Peel and an attempt by the local Black Power movement to establish Britain's first "Colored People's Union." This walkout, in protest against a union-negotiated productivity scheme, persuaded the General and Municipal Workers Union to appoint a colored shop steward—and thus to fend off a "black union" independent of established leadership. A hunger strike by Bashar Ahmed, a local Black Power advocate, was ignored by the workers once they were convinced by the union to give the new pact a chance.

Even bigger news this past fall was the conviction of Mr. Ahmed's former associate Michael X, a 34-year-old West Indian, who claims to be follower of America's Malcolm X (though he is less thoughtful and rational), and whose Racial Adjustment Action Society peddles an anti-white propaganda line. Michael X was convicted under Section 6 of the 1965 Race Relations Act, which prohibits incitement to racial hatred. Many who cannot be counted among his admirers wondered out loud why no white man—particularly the voluble Duncan Sandys, a former (Tory) cabinet minister—had never been indicted under the Act.

At the same time, Campaign Against Racial Discrimination(CARD)—Britain's first civil rights organization—was under attack by militants who sought to oust its middle class white leadership. (Julia Gaitskell, the late Labor Party leader's daughter was one of CARD's principle activists.) Its November convention was seriously disrupted by this dispute and since then CARD has suffered substantial defections.

Ironically, all of these events occurred during the fall, when Harold Wilson's Labor Government announced its decision to amend the Race Relations Act of 1965 to extend its prohibitions of racial discrimination in certain types of public accommodations to areas such as housing and employment. Many now fear the impact that current racial tensions will have on the future of such legislation and on the future of civil rights lobbyists.

Five years ago, the Labor Party was denouncing the Conservatives' Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which merely created a system of labor vouchers. But after a Tory candidate won in Smethwick in 1964 with the assistance of the slogan "if you want a nigger neighbor, vote Labor," the Labor Government panicked and in 1965 produced its own White Paper on immigration, abandoning in the process the principle of unlimited entry of Commonwealth citizens to Britain and establishing tight immigration quotas.

Repeal of these quotas in 1968 or in the foreseeable future just isn't in the cards. The Labor Government's decision to severely limit the entry rights of Kenyan Asians holding British passports highlights the impracticability of any hope for a quota repeal—and, even more unhappily, the depths to which the Wilson Administration has sunk in order to avoid being outflanked by bigots.

Despite the outcry against the Government's harsh measures, the coming months will likely focus more attention on the rights of the colored immigrants who live in Britain. Indeed, Home Secretary James Callaghan has renewed his predecessor's promise to introduce legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in employment and housing.

Evidence of widespread racial discrimination in Britain has been extensively documented. Last April, for instance, a report on racial discrimination was issued under the sponsorship of the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants and the Race Relations Board. Conducted through the use of interviews and "checkers" (in the case of hiring and housing), the results clearly indicated that life is more difficult for colored people in Britain than it is for whites, and that color plays the major role in this difference. As a prominent West Indian physician who resigned from the Labor Party over immigration quotas said, "I refuse to speak of any 'immigrant' issue. What we have here is a racial problem, not an immigrant problem."

The racial situation might not be so well publicized were it not for the efforts of CARD. The overwhelming percentage of complaints brought to the Race Relations Board have been filed through the Committee's initiative. Although its leadership has consisted of middle class whites, CARD is attempting to overcome the handicap by setting up local organizations with working class leadership. (The factionalism in the West Indian organizations, the Indian Workers Association [extremely left-wing] and others makes this a difficult task, however.) A recent addition to the list of civil rights organizaions is the Joint Council for Welfare of Immigrants, which will attempt to help immigrants in their country of origin as well as at the British port of entry. But both JCWI and CARD are troubled by the radicalism of Michael X which they see as a threat to the future of civil rights legislation. His virulent anti-white philosophy does not have a real hold on any segment of the colored population—but whites read about him and may react against civil rights as well as him. And those who sought the ouster of all whites from CARD's leadership were able seriously to disrupt a recent CARD conference and to precipitate a walkout by some of the white leaders, including Julia Gaitskell.

Although there is nothing in Britain resembling American ghettos in either size or misery, one can still see "no coloured" signs (as well as an occasional "no Irish" sign) in London itself. Last September, a group of Londoners bought a house that was about to be sold to a

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Jamaican so as to keep the neighborhood white. And Professor John Rex, a member of the Government's advisory group on immigrant housing, has resigned and attacked the Ministry for Housing for failing to deal firmly with discrimination by local governmental authorities in council houses.

Most of the complaints received by the Race Relations Board allege discrimination in employment. (In the past year, 97 related to employment, 37 to housing, and 12 to financial facilities—only 85 out of 309 complaints were within the scope of the Race Relations Act of 1965.) Civil rights proponents in Britain may be discovering the significance of employment—and the relative insignificance of public accommodations—at a much earlier stage than did their American counterparts.

The report on discrimination issued last April showed that discrimination exists in hiring, promotion, layoffs and training. What really surprised a good many of the more enlightened whites in Britain was that colored people with adequate skills and good qualifications were turned away to the same or greater extent as the unskilled. And not only do private employment agencies "screen out" colored workers, but so do the government's employment exchanges; they have marked their cards with the initials "C.W."

The Trade Union Congress (the equivalent of the AFL-CIO) is ambivalent on the problem—a point which was emphasized at their September, 1967, conference in Brighton, where, after heated debate, a resolution supporting anti-discrimination legislation was referred to the General Council for further consideration. (Incidentally, there was not one colored delegate at the conference.) The unions fear an erosion of their voluntary procedures for negotiation and a new separate system for colored workers.

Although private conversations with some TUC officials reveal outright hostility to legislation (raising the specter of quotas and the problems of enforcement), the powerful Transport and General Workers Union has gone on record in favor of legislation. As Jack Jones, assistant general secretary of the TGW, says, "We need the force of law to back us up when we talk with the men on the shop floor." But he quickly adds that trade unions cannot deal with these problems by themselves, citing his union's inability to get London Transport's colored bus drivers and conductors into inspector jobs, and the unwillingness of his white members to take an interest in *anyone's* promotion—black, brown, or white—into what are in effect supervisory positions.

Unlike American unions, the British have not barred colored workers from membership, nor have they set up segregated locals. But most colored workers do not belong to unions; as in the United States, their seniority and apprenticeship rules—perfectly legitimate in *vacuo*—have a tendency to harm colored people. Moreover, there is evidence than union-negotiated "British labor only" collective agreements—initially intended against Italian and Polish workers—are being applied against colored workers. Since many of these agreements place non-British labor at the bottom of the seniority list in time of layoff, they may assume more significance unless the Wilson Government is able to reduce or stabilize unemployment soon.

Will there be effective legislation by Parliament? In addition to some deep-seated notions of racial superiority inherited from the days of the Empire—and the "backlash" that Black Power and Michael X types may set into motion—there are two main obstacles. The first is the inability of most British people to recognize racial prejudice in their own country. The second is organized political opposition. Edward Heath, the leader of the Conservative Party, has already lashed out against the "hot-headed demands of doctrinaire agitators," stating that the country must be ". . . sure that it [legislation] will not harm the very people that it is intended to protect by closing opportunities to them or by creating new and unnecessary bitterness within the community."

The question of what form legislation will take is about as important as whether there will be any at all. Some have suggested that the Ministry of Labor be called upon to contribute its mediation expertise. But the same arguments which eventually excluded the U.S. Department of Labor from jurisdiction over our Title VII fair employment practices provisions militate against this proposal also. Any department which regularly deals with the problems of labor or management is too bound up with their interests—and not those of colored workers. Besides, civil rights advocates want enforcement powers and not mediation.

Recently, the three-man Street Committee—headed by Professor Harry Street of Manchester University—which had studied anti-discrimination legislation in the United States and Canada, urged a law to set up local tribunals to hear complaints of discrimination upon the failure of conciliations. These tribunals would be staffed by county court judges and others who might be named by the Lord Chancellor. The Race Relations Board would assist the tribunal in the gathering of evidence; but their major function would be to decide the remedy to be awarded subsequent to a finding of discrimination by the tribunal. And, most important, a board's order would be enforceable in court.

If this proposal is enacted, enforcement will be more effective and coverage will be greater (housing is the biggest example) than under American federal law, and bureaucratic inefficiences will be minimized by the local tribunals. The Race Relations Board will have much more importance.

The probability is that there will be legislation some time during this year. Roy Jenkins, Labor's energetic and attractive Chancellor of the Exchequer, put his personal prestige behind it and Home Secretary James Callaghan

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has done the same. The objectives of the law? First, to avoid the calamities of American race relations and our riot-torn summers. In this regard, the Race Relations Board is optimistic: ". . . we have great advantages: our coloured population has arrived here far more recently and patterns of behavior, both among immigrants and among the indigenous population, are more flexible; we are more law-abiding and the structure of our constitution gives the central government far greater control over policies." Yet one is uneasily reminded of the Eisenhower years in America when one heard so often that "everything is gradually getting better" and that "the least said about the problem, the better."

The overriding objective of the Labor Government, in the words of Roy Jenkins, is not the "flattening process of assimilation" but rather one "of equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance." But the unanswered question is whether this goal can be realized quickly enough to meet what are sure to be the rising expectations of sons and daughters of immigrants—the next generation's colored job seekers.

A POET ON VIETNAM

Murder as a Prudent Policy

Following is the acceptance speech of Robert Bly on winning the National Book Award for Poetry:

I am uneasy at a ceremony emphasizing our current high state of culture. Cultural events, traditionally, put writers to sleep, and even the public. But we don't want to be asleep any more. Something has happened to me lately. Every time I have glanced at a bookcase in the last few weeks, the books on killing of the Indians leap out into my hand. Reading a speech of Andrew Jackson's on the Indian question the other day—his Second Annual Message—I realized he was the Westmoreland of 1830. His speech was like an Administration speech today. It was another speech recommending murder of a race as a prudent policy, requiring stamina. Perhaps this coincidence should not have surprised me, but it did. It turns out we can put down a revolution as well as the Russians in Budapest, we can destroy a town as well as the Germans at Lidice, all with our famous unconcern.

As Americans, we have always wanted the life of feeling without the life of suffering. We long for pure light, constant victory. We have always wanted to avoid suffering, and therefore we are unable to live in the present. But our hopes for a life of pure light are breaking up. So many of the books nominated this year—Mr. Kozol's on education in the slums, Mr. Styron's, Mr. Rexroth's, Mr. Mumford's, Miss Levertov's, Mr. Merwin's—tell us that from now on we will have to live with grief and defeat.

We have some things to be proud of. No one needs to be ashamed of the acts of civil disobedience committed in the tradition of Thoreau. What Dr. Coffin did was magnificent; the fact that Yale University did not do it is what is sad. What Father Berrigan did was noble; the fact that the Catholic Church did not do it is what is sad. What Mitchell Goodman did here last year was needed and in good taste; the sad thing is that the National Book Committee, last year, in trying to honor those who told the truth, should have invited as a speaker Vice President Humphrey, famous for his lies. Isn't the next step, now that individual people have committed acts of disobedience, for the institutions to take similar acts? What has the book industry done to end the war? Nothing. What have the universities done to end the war? Nothing. They actively help the war by their defense research. What has my own publisher, Harper & Row, done to help end the war? Nothing. In an age of gross and savage crimes by legal governments, the institutions will have to learn responsibility, learn to take their part in preserving the nation, and take their risk by committing acts of disobedience. The book companies can find ways to act like Thoreau, whom they publish. Where were the publishing houses when Dr. Spock and Mr. Goodman and Mr. Raskin, all three writers, were indicted? What publishing houses do is up to them. It's clear they *can* have an editorial policy; they *can* refuse to pay taxes.

These concerns are not unconnected with such a ceremony as this. For if the country is dishonored, where will it draw its honor from to give to its writers? I respect the National Book Awards, and I respect the judges, and I thank them for their generosity. At the same time, I know I am speaking for many, many American poets when I ask this question: Since we are murdering a culture in Vietnam at least as fine as our own, do we have the right to congratulate ourselves on our cultural magnificence? Isn't that out of place? You have given me an award for a book that has many poems in it against the war. I thank you for the award, and for the $1,000 check. I am turning it over to the draft resistance movement, specifically to the organization called The Resistance. That is an appropriate use of an award for a book of poems mourning the war. Thank you very much.

Whereupon Mr. Bly handed the $1,000 Award check to Michael Kempton, representing The Resistance, and counseled him to defy the draft.

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A response from Rome: by Edward Heston

'TRIAL BY LAICIZATION'

Rome

To the Editors: The Dec. 8, 1967, issue of *Commonweal,* pp. 328-331, carried an article entitled "Trial by Laicization" by Peter Declan, a name indicated in a footnote as "the pseudonym of a recently laicized American priest." The purpose of the article was to outline the various steps required of the priest seeking a dispensation from celibacy. The resulting picture "bears all the marks of a classic ecclesiastical horror story," but for anyone acquainted with the real procedure the picture is anything but objective and cannot fail to make a most regrettable impression. Precisely because it claims to have been "carefully checked for accuracy," such a presentation can easily have adverse effects on the faith of the unwary and can at least weaken confidence in the Holy See.

Hence, the following clarifications will appear to be thoroughly in order. It is regrettable that they come so late after the appearance of the original article, but the issue of *Commonweal* for Dec. 8, did not reach Rome until late January. Nevertheless, it has been thought well even at this late date to provide clarifications in order to counteract the harm caused by the original article.

At the outset, it must be stated emphatically that these remarks are not intended as a personal attack on a laicized fellow-priest, nor do they insinuate any bad faith or malicious ill-will. Peter Declan's sincerity must be accepted at face value, but it will be clear that he just did not have the facts.

A careful distinction is in order between the intransigent attitudes of perhaps even numerous Ordinaries and what represents the mind of the Holy See. One of the difficulties in replying to "Trial by Laicization" is that the article admittedly contains some elements of truth which it would be foolhardy to attempt to deny. These clarifications will not undertake to explain away any of the harshness or lack of understanding encountered by priests sincerely in search of a legitimate solution to a crushing personal problem. But it should be remembered that the Church is now in a transition phase from the former almost iron-clad policy of no dispensations at all to an attitude marked by clemency and human consideration for personal problems. It is not surprising that this new approach to the problem has not yet penetrated equally to all bishops throughout the world. But the weakness of the article lies in over-extending individual cases to universal generalizations. Only if we rise above the difficulties posed by individual problems can we hope to arrive at a broader view of the entire picture in order to see just what represents the authentic stand of the Church.

Peter Declan's observations suffer from the fatal weakness of being admittedly based largely on hearsay, rather than on first-hand and accurate knowledge of the facts. "Trial by Laicization" states textually that it has been "drawn from many bits of information supplied by a wide variety of American, European, and South American priests and carefully checked for accuracy. These sources include members of the Roman Curia, canon lawyers, chancery officials, and bishops as well as priests who have sought Rome's permission to marry." Information gathered from such an avowedly wide variety of sources, none of which can focus on the whole picture, cannot reflect that cohesive unity and seriousness of purpose which everyone has a right to expect in a matter of such delicacy and far-reaching personal and social importance. There is not the slightest indication that any information has come directly from sources directly connected with the Special Commission which reviews these cases. A structure of objective truth can never be built up simply by piling hearsay upon hearsay.

Peter Declan complains that "it is practically impossible to get a clear idea of what Rome considers 'sufficient reason' for granting an *ante factum* permission to marry." It is quite true that "sufficient reason" has not been reduced to capsule form, precisely because individual cases differ so widely one from the other. A reason considered "sufficient" in the general background of one case might in another case not have the same persuasive influence.

One point which must be emphasized is that flouting the law by marrying first and then requesting a dispensation from celibacy provides absolutely no guarantee of eventual favorable actions. Some misunderstanding may have arisen from the fact that when ordinaries and superiors general of clerical communities were first advised of the existence of a new Special Commission—it should be noted that Rome took the initiative in so informing them—they were urged to make special efforts on behalf of older priests already involved in situations holding forth little or no hope or desire of return to the ministry. But any assertion that a priest who wants a dispensation has only to take things into

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FATHER EDWARD HESTON, *an American Holy Cross Father long resident in Rome, is attached to the Sacred Congregations for the Doctrine of the Faith, the Discipline of the Sacraments and Religious. He was English-language Press Officer during Vatican Council II and also during the recent Synod of Bishops.*

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his own hands by attempting marriage before a civil magistrate or a non-Catholic minister and then come back and file his petition is absolutely and unconditionally devoid of all foundation.

As for what may constitute "sufficient cause," the following passage, translated from the Latin, from a letter addressed on July 14, 1966, to the ordinary of one of our larger metropolitan sees in the United States is very clear: "It is not true, as has been sometimes affirmed, that the dispensation in question is granted only to those priests who have already apostatized through attempted marriage. Dispensations have been granted also to priests who have not left the Church, but in whose case serious reasons counseled that the dispensation should be granted. Hence if there be any priests, who in the judgment of the ordinary, after fruitless and persevering recourse to all means, natural and especially supernatural, in the hope of saving their priestly state, still feel the need to be dispensed, the informative process is to be prepared, conformably to the provisions of Can. 1997 of the Code of Canon Law." Even though nowhere is the phrase, "sufficient cause" really spelled out in detail, this letter shows that the Holy See is open to the objective merits of every case. The norms to be followed in preparing the informative process to which reference is made above were communicated to all local ordinaries and superiors general of clerical communities in a special instruction dated Feb. 2, 1964.

It is only natural that, if the evidence presented indicates that a priest has been guilty consistently of serious moral lapses in chastity or that the general picture of his life has not been that of a "good priest," this should weigh heavily in the balance for release from obligations which have become an intolerable burden rather than an aid to greater closeness to and likeness with Christ. Aware of the infinite power of divine grace when united with man's cooperation and persuaded that, like an earlier priest named Paul, today's priest also can do all things in the Lord who strengthens him (Phil. 4,13), the Church is unwilling to admit defeat until the facts are incontrovertible. Recourse to the drastic step of dispensation from all priestly obligations must come as a last rather than as a first resort. Otherwise it would be tantamount to easy surrender at the first onslaught of difficulty. But to state that "if a petitioner admits to serious moral lapses in chastity (whether real or fictional seems to be unimportant) a favorable reply invariably arrives in short order," is to make a statement absolutely unsupported by objective fact. The Holy See certainly has the right to presume that priests asking for such dispensations are telling the truth. A release obtained under false pretenses would hardly bring peace of soul to any priest; he would always be living with the nagging realization that he had obtained his dispensation only through lying, perhaps even perjury. Nor should it be thought that lapses in chastity are the only reasons for which the Holy See dispenses priests from celibacy along with all their other obligations.

It is alleged that the serious matter of a priest's change of canonical status is consistently bogged down in bureaucratic trivialities and craven homage to hierarchical prestige and geographical importance. The *facts* surrounding the handling of these dispensations provide an altogether different picture. Peter Declan would be hard put to cite a single case of a petition otherwise in order which was rejected *because* it originated in a geographically insignificant diocese, or, on the other hand, a single incomplete or undeserving case which provoked prompt action *because* it was presented by an archbishop or a cardinal. It is easy to forget that metropolitan and cardinalitial sees are usually better staffed and more experienced and thus are in a better position to know how to proceed. After all, dispensations are granted, not to the diocese but to the priest, and the gravity of his problems is not gauged by the size of his diocese or the hierarchical rank of his ordinary.

That "one monsignor from Mexico has had phenomenal success in obtaining *ante factum* permissions in less than a month, even for priests from other countries, simply because he had a direct channel to the right person" is a statement unable to stand up in the light of hard facts. No one connected with the Commission could recall anything which might even remotely have warranted such a claim. It is true that some petitions are sometimes cleared more rapidly because of strong recommendations stressing special circumstances. This only shows that the handling of requests is personal, not mechanical.

No request for dispensation has ever been denied because it was not presented in either Latin or in Italian. What is described in the article as the procedure to be followed in submitting a petition—one copy for the Pope, another for the Cardinal Secretary of State, both copies being sent to a certain Curia official who prepares the dossier for the Pope—must be attributed to lamentable ignorance of the actual facts.

"Because of the delicacy of the requests for *ante factum* permission and the reluctance of Rome to grant them, the careful attention and recommendation of the Curia official for favorable action is almost essential for success. A check for 30 American dollars, made out to the proper individual in Rome, also proves helpful." Even in an article already marked by glaring inaccuracies and unwarranted generalizations, such an innuendo is a stand-out. It can be stated categorically that money plays not the slightest role. Not only is no tax exacted for these dispensations, but any offerings sent are invariably returned to the petitioner. To give a concrete example, a priest who very recently received his decree of laicization, sent a check in appreciation, not for $30 but for $100. It was sent back by return mail, registered. If the total groundlessness of the above insinuation is any indication of the general "accuracy" of other statements in the article, the reader will do well to be on his guard.

Peter Declan holds to the principle that each individual priest should be free to decide whether he wants the

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priesthood with or without the obligation of celibacy even after he has accepted celibacy with Major Orders. No one, of course, questions the objective separability of priesthood and celibacy. Plain realism, however, should convince every priest that at the present time there is no prospect that this separability will in the foreseeable future be incorporated into Canon Law. Consequently, if a man feels he is called to the priesthood, it is presumed he is willing to accept that priesthood with whatever the Church requires. No individual today can claim to have a vocation to the priesthood while at the same time excluding celibacy—anymore than, to use an analogy, a citizen can insist to the Department of Defense that he feels qualified for a military career, but with exemption from the frequent re-assignments which normally go with life in the armed forces.

At the conclusion of his article Peter Declan brings up very briefly the second question he had raised earlier, namely, "is the present legislation and procedure for dispensations in keeping with the holiness of the Church?" He leaves the question unanswered except by inference and this inference is naturally in the negative. The inference however is based on the gratuitous assumption that the procedure for dispensation is the one he has portrayed in his article. That this presumption lacks all foundation can best be demonstrated by a brief review of some facts concerning the Special Commission in charge of these cases. The authenticity of the facts here set forth is guaranteed absolutely —they rest on a much firmer foundation than "many bits of information supplied by a wide variety of American, European and South American priests."

Peter Declan gives the impression that the new policy of the Holy See was inaugurated under Pope John XXIII, only to grind almost a halt with the advent of Paul VI. It is a simple matter of history that the Special Commission set up to process the granting of dispensations from celibacy owes its existence to Pope Paul VI, who acted on Feb. 2, 1964, a little more than six months after his election. No such commission existed in the time of Pope John XXIII. The only cases then accepted in principle were the ones already provided for in Canon Law, namely, those based on claims of fear or violence, undue moral pressure, etc., in receiving ordination. Instead of "very few dispensations" having been granted since the election of Pope Paul VI, the Special Commission has been functioning regularly since early 1964.

This Commission is composed of some 18 members. Among the nations represented are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the United States. Add to this geographical spread that all of these members are conversant with two or more languages. The members have not been chosen at random. One has to his credit a long career of close to 25 years of first-hand contact with priests with problems. Another is a bishop brought to Rome for a responsible position in the Curia after decades of pastoral experience. Still another before becoming a priest, was an M.D. and a practicing psychiatrist. The Commission meets generally once a week and sometimes oftener. Plans are under way for more frequent meetings.

The procedure followed usually in processing a petition for dispensation from all priestly obligations is substantially as follows. Once the dossier has been received and a first examination shows that it has been prepared in conformity with the confidential instruction issued on Feb. 2, 1964, the file is then turned over, according to its language, to a member of the above Commission. This member studies the facts of the case very carefully and draws up his report, with both a summary of all the salient facts and also his personal recommendation. This "votum" is then examined carefully by the Defender of the Bond who, like his counterpart in a marriage case, undertakes to marshal objections militating against the granting of the dispensation.

The petition is then docketed for discussion in a plenary meeting of the Commission. There each member presents the cases assigned to him for study, with open discussion following. In more difficult cases or in those which may have given rise to a marked divergence of opinion, the file will be placed on the agenda for the plenary meeting of the cardinals of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Once final recommendation has been formulated, the secretary of the Commission, prepares a brief report on each case for the Holy Father, not setting forth his own personal conclusions, but simply executing and transmitting to His Holiness the results of the group discussion in the committee.

In some individual cases, particularly those of long-standing estrangement from the priesthood, petitions are handled more directly in order to reach a solution with a minimum of delay. The vast majority of petitions presented are acted upon favorably.

Regarding the number of petitions presently pending before the Special Commission, it can be stated that the total number represents just slightly more than one-half of one percent (0.64%) of the Latin Rite priests in the world. This percentage can hardly be classified as "deluge proportions."

The preceding facts drawn from unquestionably reliable sources clearly indicate that the authentic procedures followed in the laicization of a priest are eminently in accord with the holiness of both the priesthood and the Church. They serve the double purpose of safeguarding the solemnly enunciated principle of priestly celibacy, while at the same time they mercifully permit exceptions when the obligation in individual cases has become more of a hindrance than a help to a closer union with Christ and more generous service of souls.

These clarifications, have been undertaken only to point out some of the more glaring inaccuracies and weaknesses of Peter Declan's article. They were necessary in order to put the facts of the case in their proper light. The present author feels that Peter Declan will himself welcome this authentic information which can serve to assuage his fears that the method of handling dispensations from priestly celibacy constitutes a menace for the holiness of the Church.

EDWARD L. HESTON

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MEDIA

From time to time, the Public Broadcasting Laboratory overcomes its tendency to didacticism and demonstrates the potential of educational television. "The Frustrated Campus," produced by Joseph Russin and his assistants Rossita Sarnoff and Michael Nolan, offered an excellent instance of that potential. Indeed, the program achieved a kind of allegorical psycho-drama of the blocks to interracial communication and the inadequacy of education as a key to social change.

The idea for the show originated with these three young PBL staff members after the rash of campus demonstrations against the Dow Chemical Company and the violence at Wisconsin and San Francisco State College. Initially, they intended to do an "inter-connect" of participants at three types of campuses—San Francisco, Illinois and Harvard. Budgeting problems and fear that high-tensions at San Francisco State might set off an ugly scene led to a decision to tape one long session at the University of Illinois Champaign-Urbana campus, with students, professors and administrators flown in from other schools, among them Tougaloo, Antioch, Amherst and Berkeley.

One result was that all the participants were forced to face each other directly. Secondly, the huge lounge of the Illini Union made the cameras seem less obtrusive and as the taping proceeded, the participants showed a great deal of frankness and spontaneity. Finally, Russin and his aides did an admirable job of editorial selections which captured the inter-personal strains that underlie the "frustrated campus."

Ostensibly, the topic was whether recent student drives to ban government and business recruiters contradicted the "open campus" principles previously advocated by free-speech movements. However, the presence of a Black Student Association contingent, which sat and operated as a bloc, caused a complete switch in tenor and subject in a way similar to the Black Caucus domination of the New Politics Conference last August. Nonetheless, certain deeper issues were exposed and what occurred may well become an historic documentary on the universities of the '60s, precisely because it allows activists and academics to bare for themselves certain deep conflicts which previously have not been brought to public attention.

"The PBL started out hoping to examine student power, the fight for a student voice in campus affairs," Russin commented. "We found, instead, a display of university anger and frustration with itself and with the world. This division may not be directly connected with the issue of student power, but it is the ingredient that makes for continuing student demonstrations."

The program began with white radicals trying to justify admitted violations of civil libertarianism: "The criticism that we infringed upon the liberty of those who wanted to speak to the recruiters is justified," one leader replied, "but the students who sat in wanted set up a hierarchy of values; they said that the right to life was more important than the right of free speech." As the program progressed, the young anti-war demonstrators were pressed by blacks and academics on racial and educational issues. In response, they resorted to a contradictory ideology which other new leftists, who are still devoted to free speech and integration, refer to as "corporate radicalism." On television this "corporate radicalism" came off as a simplistic obverse of the so-called "corporate liberalism" of the "American Establishment." Thus, such corporate radical advocates as NSA president Ed Schwartz and former Berkeley leader Mike Rossman criticized social science behaviorialism and the kind of "nation-building" being foisted on South Vietnam. Yet, in place of the present system, they *literally* called for universities which would "process" and "program" people so that they may acquire "tools to touch the culture" and "model-building" for a participatory democracy. There was more than a rhetorical resemblance to IBM terminology. "I thought the students were trying to keep the university straight," a dismayed sociology professor remarked. "And I find out that's not what it's all about." In the end, the program became an exposé of the perils and poverty of corporate radicalism.

This became apparent as the whites, liberals and radicals all tripped all over one another in an attempt to answer the question posed by black spokesman and community organizer John Lee Johnson: "What about the moral and the psychological napalm the whites are dropping on blacks?" When Rossman referred to anti-war marches as "a strike for you too, *dig* it," the blacks told him to "cut that shuck and jive." The blacks claimed that what happens "across the ocean doesn't involve us at all": "Don't give me no South Vietnam bag," said Johnson, "don't give me no hang-up on no Dow Chemical Company." To this, the white radicals, responded with a combination of apologizing and patronizing: "we agree," "we're behind you," "we're just children here," "why is it that we don't see any black janitors hired by the university?" Exasperated UI Student Senate President Patsy Parker summed up the "we-feel-a-little-black-too" psychology when she said: "The machine hits at me too . . . It hits at me because it tells me what kind of person I can be, that I have to wear shoes all the time, which I don't have on right now . . . it tells me what kind of thoughts I can think, It tells me everything."

Then, Rossman sought to equate "the struggle for black liberation and the struggle for educational reform." Before he finished, the blacks had hooted at "all these trivial little things" and retorted that most anti-war whites "don't give a hang about a black person." Ac-

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cording to Black Student Association leader David Addison (whose own group had risen from inertia only two days before to hold its first demonstration for PBL cameras), "After each group of students goes through the university, they don't continue the movement. They accept a job with Dow, IBM, or any other firm! These are the people that perpetuate the system."

When a few faculty members switched back to discussion of the megaversity, Johnson led a black walk-out. This dramatic gesture had been prefaced by persistent agitation to run the entire show. Sitting behind Russin, Johnson kept saying: "Hey, don't call on that whitey, there's a black man here wants to speak." Just before the walk-out, Johnson had lost all cool when one student complained that "we don't need these black people to come in and vent their pent-up frustrations against people who spend quite a bit of their lives trying to help them." Furious, Johnson scowled: "You're nothing, 'cause what you know about niggers ain't nothing."

Later, several unlikely heroes emerged to challenge the mechanistic imagery of NSA and SDS rhetoric: "I don't recognize the picture of education that's been presented by my good friend Ed Schwartz, as well as by some other people," Philip Monypenny, the AAUP Student Rights chairman, said. "Students who come here are constantly being told—at least in the classrooms in which I teach —about some of the problems which presumably are being hidden from them. And if they're not reacting, it's not because someone is not trying to tell them . . . When I was a student we did not think that everything you were and could be was defined by the institutions. We thought we could find it for ourselves." At this point, Rossman petulantly interjected: "Your way didn't work . . . And you're sitting there and you're telling me, 'Listen to my old man.' " Even John Summerskill, radical administrator who resigned last week at San Francisco, felt compelled to disagree: "I don't think Mike really believes part of what he's saying. He can't." Then student radical Fred Landis got down to the nitty-gritty: "The professors who have been called upon here to defend themselves are precisely the most progressive and intelligent and humanitarian professors at this university . . . We haven't been attacking what is really pressing us, things like the Pentagon and Lyndon Johnson. We've been attacking each other."

In good documentary tradition, Russin's "The Frustrated Campus," left the drawing of conclusions up to the viewer: nothing was purposefully staged. It was reassuring to see that the urbanity and honesty of the Monypennys and their student counterparts could surmount the heated-up medium of confrontation by television. And, although the black power and student power ideologues contended that "the academic bag" has "nothing to say," their own inability to go "beyond talk" and deal with "the real problems," was revealed by their own words.

JOHN QUIRK

EYE ON THE EAGLE

ETC.

As if to disprove McLuhan, publishing companies continue to glut with new magazines a market already grown bleary from reading about itself. The market in question, of course, is Youth—*Time* Man of 1967, spender of billions, leisured and literate at least in an electronic, middlebrow sort of way. But now, with the appearance of *eye* magazine we learn what the big boys think popular and youth "culture" is all about.

That America has always been future- and youth-oriented is beyond serious question; that the standards of our adolescent millions should have come to predominate in our every waking moment may be the logical extension of this orientation, but it is alarming nonetheless. What this has accomplished is not difficult to see: not only has society surrendered to the very young prerogatives reserved traditionally to those with a more wrinkled outlook, but it has in the process managed to get across the idea that this stuff is really imporant by dispassionate standards of critical judgment. What this has come to mean in day-to-day terms is the abandonment of our critical faculties altogether in a vain hope that by adult encouragement our young innovators (?) will begin really to produce that long awaited thing called "American culture." Witness, for example, that piece of fawning by Dwight Macdonald for whom Barbara Garson's *MacBird!*, a cute satirical play on LBJ, was America's answer to Rabelais; witness all the emphatic adulation of each new rock group of delightfully satanic zombies: our New Music is born; history is at its appointed end. Witness the flamboyant "underground" press with its constant refrains of "love" that make the old moon-June-spoon days look like hard-boiled *Realmusik* which is what is supposed to be happening today. One must conclude that if this is the generation that has grown up absurd, much of what it has thus far produced in cultural artifacts and literary items has reflected its existential condition. The trouble is that very few of those with any sense have dared say that our new hippie emperor is stark raving naked. We prefer to groom him instead while putting him on the cover of *Look*.

Quite naturally *eye* magazine enters this stream of pap and cultural debasement, forsaking its critical paddle for the illusions on which the country is foundered. Slickly psychedelic *cum* rock, pop, youthful abandon, innocent sex and a touch of stylized radicalism, *eye* will be published (Yours for only $6 a year) by that probing, fearless group, Hearst, Incorporated.

The first issue sends the magazine into competition with the other comatose journals of pop into a joint celebration of the present, which on closer examination turns

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out to be an example of cop-out at its American best. For although *eye,* like the other cheerleaders of the far out, is designed to nurture the illusion of "difference" it merely uses what novelty and experimentation exists in our new bohemia to transform them into salable items, hardening them along the way for the sustained market appeal. Something that *Forbes* magazine ("the capitalist tool") with its advertisement of a hippie ("tomorrow's leader") knows full well. Following the dictum that today's put-on can be tomorrow's product, *eye,* with its articles on electric fashions, focuses on the idea that the commercial world, given a certain level of affluence and immunity to the banal and silly, can sell anything—as long as it's labeled "avant-garde."

The magazine proceeds in a lilting, chirping way through strawberry fields of rock music, an interview with Donovan and a column called "Escalator" on young people on the way up. Far from being traditional midwest business types, these people are represented by Ed Schwartz, president of NSA ("a radical, an accomplished jazz musician . . .") and others who soon will be threatening not the warmakers but the next one up in his particular hierarchy.

The one serious attempt at controversy is provided by columnist Pete Hamill, erstwhile radical, former war- and Johnson-critic for the New York *Post.* But smoothed around the edges, his piece, "End the Draft or Draft Women Now," becomes compliance couched as muckraking in an obvious ploy at the "concerned" generation. Without mentioning the word "Vietnam" once in his piece, Hamill resigns himself to the present and becomes an advocate of drafting women. "If women were drafted," Hamill writes, "the armed forces could find literally hundreds of thousands of jobs for them to fill. The Pentagon is overflowing with burly sergeants and corporals assaulting typewriters, filing papers, mimeographing press releases and going for coffee." While they could be out there zapping the Cong. "Women could replace them," he continues, "with hardly any strain on the System, and [cutely now] they would certainly improve the manners around the place."

Hamill concedes this generation's idealism, yet his solution to the fact that there are so few socially sanctioned channels for its expression is to "draft them." (Perhaps they could do some chores around the ghettos.) And never mind the addition to an already hyper-militarized society or that the purpose of the Army is neither to educate (Robert McNamara) nor restore to a Negro his masculinity (Daniel Moynihan) but to kill people.

Hamill's article, however, is representative of a cultural trend increasingly based on the euphemism, the sham, the infusion of fun through forgetfulness. Hearst's eye is on the eagle; there are profits to be reaped in telling the kids they are making waves when they are only splashing around with their toys in the bathtub. JONATHAN EISEN

NO COWBOY, HE

THE SCREEN

Now that so many of our stars are no longer kids, producers making westerns (a genre in which movies excel) are faced with the problem of what to do with these aging actors. The producers of two new westerns solve the problem well by letting their stars play their age, and the results this time are just fine.

Portraying a hard-working, weather-beaten cowhand who's hitting 50, in the title role of "Will Penny," Charles Heston is excellent as a loner, a man who's been a cowpoke practically all his life; though he's still lively and a good shot, he's tired at the end of the drive season and glad to get a comparatively easy job as a line rider on a Montana ranch, where he'll mend fences and chase away squatters. The job turns out to be not-so-simple when he discovers way up in the mountains that a woman with her 10-year-old son on her way to join her farmer-husband in the Far West has pre-empted his line shack for the winter, and that a family of vicious, thieving rawhiders turn up every now and then to vent their evil.

Producers Fred Engle and Walter Seltzer have given "Will Penny" its full share of exquisite color photography


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of the mountains and plains, but what makes their film unsual is its non-heroic aging hero and its realistic portrait of the West as it was: no pretty, singing cowboys here, but calloused, tough men ready to fight the rigors of the weather and brutal thieves who have no sense of decency or right or wrong. Will by no means always comes out best in tangling with the rawhiders led by Donald Pleasence, portraying as cruel and mean a villain as has ever been shown in the movies. The violence with the rawhiders is extreme, not only when they beat up Will but later when they raid the shack and imprison Will and the woman. Perhaps director Tom Gries uses these scenes of violence to emphasize the hardships through which settlers in the West went. But by contrast, director-scriptwriter Gries also displays a softer and pleasanter aspect of country life in the growing friendship and love between Will and the woman (nicely played by Joan Hackett)and the interesting father-son relationship that develops between Will and the boy (John Francis). For the first time, Will realizes what he has missed in his life as a lonely cowboy. Director Gries deserves a hand for the good performances throughout "Will Penny" and scriptwriter Gries merits even more applause for his absorbing screenplay and unsentimental finale.

James Stewart and Henry Fonda are older than Charlton Heston, but as the hero and villain respectively in "Firecreek," they are absolutely right and at their best. "Firecreek" is an unpretentious little film, but in spite of its familiar "High Noon" theme about a part-time sheriff who finally decides he must take a stand and defend this crossroads town against the five ruthless adventurers who have taken it over, the picture is fascinating from beginning to end. Director Vincent McEveety takes his time about developing the characters—Stewart as the farmer-sheriff whose wife is about to have their third child and who realizes they should have gone farther west in the first place; the various townsfolk, most of whom are tired losers; these Firecreek citizens versus the five led by Henry Fonda, who considers himself a leader of men but who realizes when his four younger henchmen get out of control in Firecreek that they are not men, only hoods who bully the weak.

Perhaps the plot of "Firecreek" is familiar and some of the dialogue when it points out the moral is rather obvious, but after director McEveety establishes the players in his drama, he makes the action move at a swift clip. Eventually, of course, comes the showdown between Stewart and Fonda. Stewart has to win, but Fonda is no push-over. Because the characters have been so well developed by the actors and script, the shooting-it-out scene in the climax is all the more meaningful. Perhaps now, more than ever before, this man-must-stand-up theme is important. Its restatement in a lively movie like "Firecreek," with its good cast, is all the more welcome.

PHILIP T. HARTUNG

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BOOKS

George Kennan—the myth contained

Memoirs: 1925-1950

GEORGE F. KENNAN

Little, Brown, $10

WILSON C. McWILLIAMS

If there is a theory of politics in George Kennan's *Memoirs*, it is based on the turgid portent that politics is fundamentally the "realities of power" and not the "structure" that "clothes" them. American democracy, prone in Kennan's eyes to moralism and legalism, cannot understand the "subtleties and contradictions" of power and this is the basis of its failure in foreign affairs.

Yet power is more subtle than Kennan imagines. Inevitably, power is related to goals: speed is power for the hare, but for the tortoise, it lies in a hard shell; jungle terrain is a source of power for guerrillas and of weakness for governments; possession of the world is no important asset for one who would save his soul. Hobbes, surely "realistic" enough, put it simply: power is "present means to future good," a means of doing what we wish to do.

The goals of man, however, are as complex and as varied as man himself. Born to ignorance and physical weakness, the child is driven by the need to survive, and power implies the ability to command attention from those on whom he depends. Growth to wisdom and to strength fills the void of need, and may express itself in the power which is love for others. The two cases are extremes, the one universal, the other painfully rare: the child feels shut out from the world; the man pities its inadequacies.

For most of us, the ancients prescribed politics, a politics in which still dependent men could substitute for the arbitrariness of the family and its rigid hierarchy, the chosen relations and comparative equality of friends and citizens who share our hopes for the good life. Politics and citizenship were a means by which men, ruling and being ruled, might unite dependence and freedom, encouragement and reproof in ways which helped them up the ladder from the child's estate to that of man.

Politics, to that ancient creed and its modern adherents, was the most specifically human power, the "present means" by which man might attain the "future good" of a genuine humanity. Chesterton saw it—whatever the practice—as the national truth and ideal of America, "the pure and classic conception that no man must aspire to be . . . more than a citizen, and that no man shall endure to be anything less."

The practice falls short, of course. Men must live if they are to enjoy the good life, and the creed of the citizen does not promise success in mastering the world but only in elevating men. Beginning with an imperfect world and imperfect men, even the best politics is governed by two necessities: the needs of survival and the needs of education, reflecting man's beginning and his goal. The vocation of political man is to find the point at which the two needs overlap, and failing that, to design policies by which they may be made to overlap: he is the servant of two masters, but in a democracy it is the needs of education, the sovereignty of citizenship which must prevail. Such vague abstractions are the only terms in which one can define the "national interest."

Kennan shares none of these perspectives. He can write, as he did in *Russia and the West*, of the "cruelty of politics" and the "amorality of authority" without realizing that what he reveals is not realism but romanticism. Missing the political dimension of life, he understands neither the "romance of the citizen" nor the political vocation. His world remains the child's, bifurcated into an inner world of dream and an outer whose only law is survival.

Kennan's "case against democracy" in foreign policy is ambiguous because Kennan is a variety of democrat. His real *animus* is against traditional theories of representative and participant democracy (hence, in part, his recent attack on student activists, "Rebels Without a Program," New York *Times Magazine*, Jan. 21) which is, implicitly, a case against politics itself.

The people, as Kennan sees them, are basically sound, but are deluded by politicians. He does not quarrel with the principle that the "privilege of conducting foreign policy at all" demands domestic support. He asserts that politicians, driven by a "neurotic self-consciousness," do not seek to persuade the public to adopt policies though good in themselves, but "strike attitudes" which they believe will result in domestic support. The people, Kennan prescribes, must "detect and repudiate" such conduct.

This "democratic" view loses some of its substance, however, with the realization that the more citizen participation becomes involved, the greater is Kennan's hostility. He distrusts groups, "vocal minorities," and the Congress far more than the President, suggesting that Congress should allow the President and the Secretary of State to "use their heads" and not interfere (strange in a vigorous critic of American involvement in Vietnam).

Kennan's democracy is, in fact, a version of democratic centralism in which the President—no more than a politician, after all, if the best of a bad lot—wins public support for policies rationally designed by experts. Politics as education yields decisively to the politics of survival and skill.

Yet for Kennan to make his case he must at least show that the expert possesses a decisive superiority of technique, a prescription for success which citizens lack. Consider, then, the following items from Kennan's own record:

1) In 1936-37, Kennan viewed Hit-

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ler's policy as limited to areas "now or previously inhabited by Germans."

2) In 1938, he felt a "temperate optimism" about the future of the rump Czech state which survived Munich.

3) In the winter of 1939-40, he believed that one aim of Hitler in seeking an armistice was to "extricate his Russian admirers" from the Finnish war.

4) His initial proposal for Germany was to divide it into small principalities (strangely omitting a Holy Roman Emperor!).

5) He argued, in 1944, that an active U.S. policy of modernizing the non-Western world could only weaken the position of Great Britain (which he presumably expected to survive).

6) In 1947, he discerned something called the "vigorous political society of Arabia" as a barrier to international Communism.

7) He doubted the ability of the Chinese Communits to remain in power, and discounted China as not an industrial state and without "promise of becoming one."

If that catalogue hardly inspires confidence in the wisdom of experts, it also cannot be said that Kennan makes his case that professionals are dispassionate students of the realities of power and free from public tendencies to moralism and legalism.

Kennan writes that "Never—neither then nor at any time—did I consider the Soviet Union a fit ally or associate, actual or potential, for this country." George Kateb, scanning all of Kennan's attitudes, could conclude with justification that they echo the sentiments of a "European burgher, filled with Evangelical anti-communism." Kennan's moralism, in fact, is most distinct by being dated.

His attitude toward international legality, too, is curiously ambiguous. Kennan criticizes F.D.R. for accepting "weak verbiage" from the Soviet Union in the recognition agreement of 1933. Yet he goes on to demonstrate that the words neither helped nor hindered policy since the Soviet Union was regulated by the view of its interests held by Soviet policy makers. Given that fact, his regrets over the lack of a "favorable legal position" are beside the point, and one must sympathize with Roosevelt's impatience with the pedantries of the Department of State. In the case of the NATO Treaty, by contrast, Kennan argues that promises do not matter, that only action counts. He was himself "impatient" with Europeans who could not see that our "vital interests" would compel their defense, treaty or no. Yet the European diplomats appear to have understood the United States better than Kennan, realizing that the term "vital interests" is so vague as to be useless as a guide to the policy of a democratic state. Treaties must result in political debate, and they may deeply influence public attitudes. In other words, Europeans trusted the political process in America more than the calculations of experts as a guide to our interests.

The common theme in both cases is revealing: he who rejects the advice of professional diplomacy is an enemy, whether a legalist or no. It is this principle which unites many of the otherwise discordant views of George Kennan: the creed of the professional. The roots of that loyalty and the content of the creed are, far more than his formal pronouncements, the key to Kennan's political thought.

In more than one way, the *Memoirs* suggest that their author patterned them on Henry Adams' *Education*. He refers to himself as a man of the Eighteenth-century, not of the Enlightenment, but of Protestant, pre-industrial America. His description of his undergraduate career at Princeton is almost parallel to Adams' remarks on Harvard: "Princeton had prepared the mind for further growth. It had not stimulated in that mind any great latitude of curiosity."

The differences between the works are equally revealing. Adams wrote with irony and tongue-in-cheek exaggeration; Kennan's book is sad. Adams described his "education," Kennan, his travails.

As he tells us, Kennan grew up with a sense of isolation, a feeling of distance for the world which led him to find solace in a private world of fantasy and imagination. Shy, sensitive and withdrawn, he found nothing in college to change that childhood pattern. His description is graphic: "the silly student . . . pouting, resisting, posing, refusing to be comforted, protesting that nothing was ever enough." (Notably, it is a picture identical to that in his *Times* essay on the contemporary student.)

Kennan writes that after his first prolonged overseas tour he felt deep changes in the United States and was never again able to "identify" with America. The fact is rather the reverse:

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Kennan's inability to identify with American life preceded and may have caused his voyaging. It would not take much to see Kennan going abroad to "find himself," kinsman to Mrs. Dodsworth and to the students who succeeded him by several generations, seeking to escape the sense of estrangement.

The word "estranged" is designed. Kennan declares that, unable to identify with the United States, his loyalty was thenceforth one of "principle." Kennan was not, then, an alienated man who rejected the American creed for a higher. His distance was emotional, a feeling of being shut out, that of a lonely man hoping for acceptance and admiration. Partly, this contributed to Kennan's insight: it allowed him to understand, wistfully, the strength of national loyalty and tradition among East Europeans. Yet it led also to the "heroic" stance that postures too much to be real and calls out with the anguish of loneliness: writing of expertise in Soviet Affairs, Kennan wrote that its one reward would be "the lonely pleasure of one who stands at last on a chilly and inhospitable mountaintop where few have been before, where few can follow, and where few will consent to believe he has been."

His loyalty to the Foreign Service is only to be expected because it provided Kennan a way—however inadequate—of relating to life and to others. A bureaucratic role allowed Kennan to overcome his fears and sensitivities, by relating to others impersonally, free from emotional danger. "I no longer had to relate myself to others as a species of naked intruder. . . . I had a role to play . . . requiring no justification or apology. . . . Under this welcome mask, I felt a hitherto unknown strength. . ."

The role almost seems to have usurped the man. During the German occupation of Prague, Kennan was obliged to reject those who sought asylum in the American legation. He reveals a curious prissiness, concerned to be well shaved and dressed lest the Germans have the "satisfaction" of giving the legation a "harried appearance," as if this had been a major German concern. Combined with this is a description of dealings with refugees that is without compassion: he tells of a Jew who was allowed to stay until he could "calm his nerves" and "face the music." Yet there is a too-personal note, a lasciviousness in his description of others: "ashy pale with fear," "faces . . . twitching," "their lips were trembling when I sent them away."

Kennan's belief that the official role gives strength is connected to the power that it provides to deal with others without involvement or risk: his detachment is not an incident of the role, but a mark of its appeal. He reflects that "methods" are real and objectives the results only of human weakness and vanity. Logically, this is nonsense: methods are methods and not random behavior because they are related to an end; form always involves content. Yet the objective need not be *mine*: the role that I play is the responsibility of the dramatist in its moral effect. The creed of the professional is rooted in the belief that who wills the means need not

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

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will the end.

As one might expect, Kennan admired the "inner detachment" of Berliners in 1939, their reserved relations with Nazism. Kennan, hiding behind his role and admiring the "strength" it gave him to be immersed in life while remaining separate from it, could hardly see that the "inner" reserve of Berliners spelled their inability to resist outwardly. He could not see it as the result not of strength of mind but of terror of body, the petrified insecurity that clings to "doing one's job" as a means, not of relating to reality, but of escaping it.

Kennan was consistent: he argued against de-nazification not only on grounds of practicality but because the prohibited categories contained "nine-tenths of what is strong, able and respected" in Germany. It is a strange mind that has not yet doubted the strength of a von Braun. There is a thin but—gently—fatal line of similarity between the Kennan *Memoirs* and Eichmann at Jerusalem.

The Foreign Service affected Kennan more directly in its teaching. Some of the ideology that Kateb discerns seems traceable to this, rather than any foreign source. The doctrine of his mentors seems based on the belief in a changeless, underlying history, fixed in outline somewhere before the mid-nineteenth-century. His superiors discouraged any study of "Soviet subjects," preferring a "good Russian cultural background" defined as that of a "well-educated Russian of the old, pre-revolutionary school." It is hardly unexpected that Kennan should seek to interpret the Soviet Union in 1938 by reference to the impact as Asiatic hordes and medieval Byzantium on the Russian character, or that, although he spent three years as a student in depression Germany, he had no reflections on the rise of Nazism he now finds worth printing.

Such training has its points: in part, it lay behind Kennan's realization of the built-in barriers to Soviet control in Eastern Europe. Yet Kennan drew this doctrine, in its most general form, from Gibbon: we need have little fear of those who would seek world domination. Perhaps not, at the moment, yet Kennan does not see that Gibbon would have found incredible the sort of control which the Nazis exercised in an area as large as Germany. He overlooks, that is, the technological dynamic which makes ever wider areas of life accessible to control whatever residual limitations remain. (Gibbon, after all, believed that "civilization" was progressively limiting war.) And, in our times, blindness to that dynamic is the way of disaster.

The belief in a changeless foundation results in a form of diplomatic passivity: over and over again, Kennan's prescription is to do nothing, to keep uninvolved, to be "cool." The "history of great peoples" is fixed by their "national experiences," not by the "manipulation of foreign powers." The doctrine may sometimes result in wise policy, but on its face it is absurd: the policies or "manipulations" of foreign powers are part of the experience of peoples, great or otherwise. Worse, the creed cannot deal with the objection that there are times when men *must* act if the evolution of things moves toward catastrophe. It prevents Kennan from understanding that the basic stance of the students he assails is not based on idyllic millennialism but grim—if sometimes excessive—despair.

Kennan's devotion to his Foreign Service comrades never results in criticism, and surely he found with them a bond stronger than anything he had left "at home." Yet, being created by and based on roles, it was a friendship no deeper than that of stage lovers, constantly endangered by reminders that it is not reality. The hidden "silly student" would not disappear or be relegated to private life: that much is revealed in Kennan's relations with the Department of State, the recipient of all his projected resentments.

State, for Kennan, is obtusely subject to political pressures, even suspected of yielding to "pro-Soviet" influences in the 1930's. There is enough wrong with State that much of his criticism strikes home. Yet Kennan recounts his resentment against a decision that delayed the departure of our diplomatic personnel interned in Germany by allocating their places aboard ship to Jewish refugees. This, to Kennan, was a surrender to "Congressional pressures," a betrayal of loyal employees "although the refugees were not citizens."

Kennan is blind to the fact that the refugees were in mortal peril by his own feelings of neglect. The real complaint against the Department of State is that it did not sufficiently appreciate the men in the field. The resentment is natural in men who adopt roles and are reminded that the role is no more than the creation of dramatist and director, that politics remain sovereign over expertise. With Kennan it is only more

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REVIEWER

WILSON CAREY MCWILLIAMS teaches political science at Brooklyn College.

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explicit, reflected in his consistent bitterness that the essays he dispatched to his superiors went unread. The foreign service, and George Kennan, was unappreciated, unnoticed, and unloved.

If there is a hope for today's student it is that he will learn the truth which has eluded Kennan: that man is a political animal. Some of Kennan's criticisms of the students are wise, but his prescription—the disciplined acceptance of roles—is not enough, for man is partly the writer of his own drama. Men must be actors, but they can together write the roles that further their humanity. For that, the friends and fellow-citizens come first—not, as they did for Kennan, from roles passively accepted: "You have only to find the first friend," Twain wrote in an essay which made mock of bureaucracy. That may be difficult in this age, yet seeking and failing may have its rewards: it might provide the humor and irony with which Adams viewed the human scene and himself, which is preferable to the lonely lament of the *Memoirs*.

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CORRESPONDENCE

(Continued from page 3)

the diaconate for its own sake, I also hope that the prestige of the diaconal office will not rest upon the eventuality that it become a refuge for troubled priests. The diaconate does not need that sort of prestige, nor does the priesthood for that matter. Rather, the church needs leadership to meet the challenges of our times. Do not we all hope that the archeology of that leadership will be found in the whole church—bishops priest, deacons, religious, and most especially in laymen?

Prestige, so it seems to me, is less a matter of rank than it is of leadership. Deacons, hopefully, will win whatever prestige comes their way through suffering service to others and to the church. Priests, I think, should work out their own prestige from the nature of their own office. I have my challenge, Father; I leave yours to you.

W. D. BOOKWALTER

Brookline, Mass.

To the Editors: . . . Ah, the priest. Is he a priest forever, according to any order? The symposium says no for several reasons, the most incisive being that the priesthood is a function which can be suspended and in fact suspend is exactly what the bishops do. No one mentions the belief that the ordained priest alone can consecrate, that this is "the power and the glory" which comes to the priest from God and through the Church. If the bishop says you *may* not say Mass he cannot say you *can* not. A man can cease to function as a priest, he may in conscience have to do so, but his power as a consecrated successor to the apostles remains, or so many people think. Couldn't one of the priests in the symposium at least have mentioned so prevalent a belief? ROSEMARY KICKHAM

"Disproportionate Resources"

Austin, Tex.

To the Editors: Robert E. Neil's "The More the Merrier" (Feb. 9) provided

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much-needed emphasis on the "qualitative effects of overpopulation in an overdeveloped country." This is surely an urgent social problem, but it is inextricably bound up with the wider problem to which Neil alluded in his closing paragraphs: "Finally, a growing population in both the over- and the underdeveloped countries is bound to increase the mounting tensions between them. Each additional American, owing to our high living standard, will consume a disproportionate share af the world's resources. And he will do so at a time when these resources are getting scarcer and scarcer."

Fr. Philip Berrigan has pointed out the magnitude of this disproportion in a *Catholic Worker* article (March-April, 1967): we comprise one-sixteenth of the world's population, but we control 52 percent of the world's productive wealth. Other sources lend confirmation. For example, the 1966 *Statistical Abstract* indicates the composition of consumer spending in 1964: we spent about $19 billion eating out, $80 billion for home-prepared food, $12 billion for alcohol, $8 billion for tobacco, $24 billion for recreation, and $23 billion for purchases of automobiles. Compare this $166 billion with the combined GNP of the European Free Trade Association countries (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.) which amounted to $150 billion in 1964. West Germany's GNP of $103 billion was the highest in Europe in 1964.

These comparisons are startling, of course, but would dwindle to insignificance if similar comparisons were made between consumption in the U.S. and the GNPs of poor countries.

The relevant problem with respect to Neil's article and the emphasis of his closing paragraphs is not so much what can be done to alter institutional structures which automatically perpetuate American control of most of the world's resources, although this is a question that is ultimately crucial. The immediate problem is too many Americans. Certainly a good middle-class American family with three or four children consumes more resources than one with two children, since all the offspring of such a family must be provided with toys, clothing, allowances, cosmetics, and transportation in keeping with their high status in the world (or their father's) . . .

Considerations such as these should enable our theologians and teachers to view the moral problems of contraception in a wider perspective which would ease the transition from the traditional biologistic emphasis.

WILLIAM HILDRED

Shannon Rebuked

New York, N.Y.

To the Editors: William V. Shannon's comments on the Vietnam war in your Feb. 23 issue raise many questions and counter-comments, of which here are a few. Speaking of the time we have already spent on the war, Mr. Shannon says that "less than three years is not enough to win it." How many more years would he estimate it to take? At the rate of more than 100 American deaths per week, one more year means at least 5,200 dead soldiers. Five more years? 26,000 deaths? Ten more years? 520,000 deaths? These are quantities for Americans only, and for deaths only. Or does Mr. Shannon expect the weekly casualties to decrease? And what does "win it" mean? Against what risks or benefits are these lives being weighed—not to mention the wounds and disabilities—not to mention the casualties of our allies—not to mention the casualties on the other side? . . .

Moralities are seldom clear-cut; it takes a wise and subtle moralist indeed to decide which sins the United States will sacrifice a hundred lives a week to prevent. EDWIN KENNEBECK

East Sandwich, Mass.

To the Editors: William Shannon begs the same question regularly begged by those who use his argument. What he and others like him seem to be saying is that when the Viet Cong, or the North Vietnamese, exhibit their inhumanity they excuse ours . . . Morally, this is weak ground, so weak it is surprising anyone would appeal to such reasoning . . . HARRIET MAROT TAYLOR

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

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
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